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Policy Research Working Paper 6267
This paper analyzes real estate market dynamics over 
the past decade in the city of Ahmedabad, India, with 
a view to improving the living conditions of the large 
population living in slums. The paper combines census 
data, the National Sample Survey, and slum household 
surveys to review the demand side of the market. Satellite 
photography was used to estimate the production of 
both formal and informal housing over the past ten 
years. Analysis of the execution of the development 
plan for the Ahmedabad region and town planning 
schemes shows how the system of housing supply has 
evolved. These analyses are used to assess the feasibility 
of various approaches to achieving “slum free” cities, the 
goal of the Government of India’s planned assistance 
program Rajiv Awas Yojana. The paper concludes that 
notwithstanding a substantial increase in public housing 
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production in recent years, providing subsidized formal 
homes from government or through reservations for 
lower income groups in private developments would 
take more than a generation just to handle the current 
slum population—representing one-third of households. 
Providing basic environmental infrastructure services in 
existing underserved neighborhoods—a proven approach 
under the Slum Networking Program—and bolstering 
infrastructure networks for the city to accommodate 
increased demand are affordable and feasible. Addressing 
issues such as rural-urban land conversion and ambiguous 
land tenure, and allowing flexibility for realistic building 
standards and increasing maximum floor space standards 
in certain neighborhoods can help to ensure a growing 
supply of housing that is affordable for moderate and 
low-income households. 
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Ahmedabad 
More but Different Government for “Slum2 Free” and Livable Cities 
 
I. Methodology and Context 
 
The purpose of this work is (i) to gather basic information necessary to prepare a broad 
assessment of feasibility for immediate actions to improve key public services and environmental 
conditions for all households in low-cost informal housing; and (ii) to prepare an assessment of 
impediments to supply of housing across the income spectrum and recommendations for actions 
that will make that supply more responsive to increased demands as population and incomes 
grow. Such measures would reduce pressure on prices and make decent and dignified housing 
more widely affordable.  
 
The objective is to mobilize support at the city, state and federal levels of government and within 
the local community for a program of short and medium term actions and investments based on a 
commonly shared and credible set of data. As such, the study focuses on working with reliable, 
available data to the extent possible rather than seeking to prepare a definitive research analysis 
that would take years to develop. .The focus of the study is its city-wide perspective—taking a 
comprehensive look at the entire market and infrastructure network and examining what it would 
take to provide minimum shelter standards for all. It does not pretend at this stage to present the 
most precise and detailed information on each topic—which must be left to the responsible 
agencies. We sought a level of accuracy that permits us to make a quick assessment of what a 
comprehensive program would entail. Should there be agreement on moving forward with the 
approach, full feasibility and design studies would be required.  
 
We have chosen to illustrate the city level approach in Ahmedabad, because many parts of the 
envisaged program of investment and reform have already been successfully piloted here.  For 
the purpose of data gathering and analysis, we have taken the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation (AMC) as extended in 2006 to represent the city of Ahmedabad. This area captures 
virtually all of the built up area in the agglomeration.  
 
Consultations as the work progresses have been an integral part of the study.  Likewise, the study 
includes documentation of the methodology used in preparing the assessment to illustrate how 
other cities wishing to take a similar approach might proceed.(Annex 5). 
 
II. Introduction and Background on Factors Driving Demand for Housing in 
Ahmedabad 
 
Ahmedabad is a fast growing city in one of India’s most dynamic and rapidly urbanizing states. 
Table II.1 shows that Gujarat, at 42.6 percent is well over the all-India urbanization average of 
31.2 percent as measured in the 2011 Census.  Likewise the speed at which urbanization in 
Gujarat is taking place is considerably more rapid than in all of India, which changed less than 2 
percentage points over ten years. The average annual growth rate of urban population in Gujarat 
                                                 
2 Throughout this study, when we refer to slums, we are referring to any underserviced substandard informal 
housing area. This may include chawls/challis that have conditions similar to slums, even through ownership 
arrangements and administrative treatment of slums and challis may differ. Our emphasis is on providing basic 
neighborhood improvements to areas that do not have them. As such, an underserviced chawl is not that different 
from a slum. There is of course considerably variability among different slums and challi areas, which must be taken 
into account when detailed investment plans are drawn up.  
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for the next 15 years has been forecast at 2.9 percent3, indicating continued high urban 
population growth in the state for an extended period.  As is commonly the case, Ahmedabad, 
the largest city in the state, has been growing more slowly than the total urban population of the 
state. It is also important to note that while population growth rates in both the AMC and the 
urban areas of Gujarat rose in the recent census, they are considerably lower than in the 1970s. 
These healthy growth rates and the relatively youthful age profile of the population clearly imply 
that household formation in the AMC—not currently measured at the corporation or urban 
agglomeration area—are likely to be buoyant and will require a substantial supply response to 
avoid major real estate price increases. However, rising prices and continuing large shares of the 
population in slums are not the result of out of control urbanization. Rates of growth are actually 
declining.  
 
  
Table II. 1 Population and Urbanization Growth in Ahmedabad 1971-2011 
 
 
Source: Census of India, various years 
 
Note: Growth of AMC population between 1991 and 2001 is not shown due to expansion of 
AMC area in 2001. Since population is measured on two different areas in the different 
years, the growth number reflects the jurisdictional shift not population growth.  
 
Incomes are, however, growing rapidly. Per capita net state domestic product has grown at over 
8.4 percent per annum in real terms between 2001 and 20104, placing Gujarat amongst the most 
rapidly growing states in the country.  Employment as reported in the Census of 2001 grew by 4 
percent a year between 1991 and 2001 in the urban agglomeration of Ahmedabad, as against a 
population growth of 3 percent5. This is typical of the pattern for the state as a whole, with 
employment in urban areas outpacing both population growth in the cities and the rate of 
employment growth in the state as a whole. Table II.2 illustrates. Median household expenditure 
in Ahmedabad as measured by the National Sample Survey, has grown at over 5 percent a year 
in real terms in the 5 years  between 2004/2005 and 2009/20106. Thus, the problems of 
affordable housing in the AMC are resulting not from a distressed economy and growing 
poverty. The issue in this city lies elsewhere. 
                                                 
3 Report Of The Technical Group On Population Projections Constituted By The national Commission On 
Population May 2006.Office Of The Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India 2a, Mansingh Road, New 
Delhi 
4 RBI website Handbook of Statistics of the Indian Economy. consulted 08/11/11 
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/009T_HBS120911.pdf 
5 Data from Census 2001 and 1991 Marginal Workers and Main Workers Categories. Such employment data is not 
available for the AMC itself and only for the Urban Agglomeration (UA). 
6 Nominal data is converted using the GDP deflator for Gujarat published by the Reserve Bank of India. As is 
commonly the case with rapid income growth, the mean expenditure is growing more rapidly than the median. The 
ratio between mean and median in the 2009/10 survey has risen only slightly to 1.22 from 1.20 in the 2004/05 data.  
1971 1981 1991 2001 2011
Population in '000
Gujarat State 26,697               34,086               41,310               50,671               60,384            
Gujarat - Urban 7,497                 10,601               14,248               18,930               25,713               
Ahmedabad MC ( AMCext from 2001) 1,731                 2,396                 2,924                 4,520                 5,571                 
Average Annual Pop'n Growth Rates
Gujarat State 2.47% 1.94% 2.06% 1.77%
Gujarat - Urban 3.53% 3.00% 2.88% 3.11%
Ahmedabad MC 3.30% 2.01% NA 2.11%
Ratios
Gujarat State  Urban/Total 28.1% 31.1% 34.5% 37.4% 42.6%
Ahmedabad AMC/Gujarat Urban 23.1% 22.6% 20.5% 23.9% 21.7%
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Table II. 2 Growth Rates of Employment and Population 1991-2001 
 
Average Annual Growth 1991-2001  
  Employment Population 
Gujarat 2.5% 2.1% 
Gujarat Urban  3.8% 2.9% 
Ahmedabad UA 4.0% 3.0% 
 
 
In order to understand the demand for housing in Ahmedabad in relation to the supply of formal 
housing, it is essential to examine the distribution of household income, not just examine 
averages.  
 
The income distribution of households within the AMC current boundaries is shown for 2001 
and 2011 on the two graphs of Figure II.1. The population living in slums/challis is shown as 
yellow bars while the population living outside slums is shown as blue bars. Predictably, the 
slum population is mostly clustered at the left part of the graph for the 2 years measured. 
However, we can see an overlap between the income of the more affluent households living in 
slums and the income of the less affluent living in formal housing. The total number of 
households living in slums/challis in both years is derived from the slum mapping described in 
section III.  Based on data for the distribution of household income, we were then able to 
determine how high up the income distribution are the households obliged to live in slums. We 
then cross check this information with a sample of housing prices using standard affordability 
measures of multiples of income.  
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Figure II.1 Distribution of Household Income 2001 and 2011 by Income Category7 
Source: Author’s Calculations See Annex 1 for more details. 
 
                                                 
7. As can be seen from the cumulative distribution curve, median income has nonetheless increased considerably. 
This graph should not be interpreted as a measure of inequality because the categories on the x-axis are not 
percentages of income. These figures are distribution of income are shown in nominal terms because we are 
interested in understanding how well the current population can afford housing in current—not real--prices.  
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Figure II.1 illustrates the very striking upward trend in household incomes over the ten 
year period under study. The median income has increased to 2.7 times what it was in 2001. 
While we have no comparable data for housing prices over the period, it is nonetheless striking 
that formal housing is still not affordable for a large part of the population. The population living 
in challis and slums alone represents more than two million people, and they cannot be placed in 
new housing overnight. As such, there is a dramatic and immediate need for better services for 
this very substantial share of the population. A strategy for meeting this need will be discussed in 
detail in Sections IV and V below.  
 
If the supply of housing were perfectly elastic any increase in income for the higher income slum 
dwellers would allow them to move into formal housing. If the supply of housing were 
completely inelastic then higher incomes would result in higher prices and a general increase in 
income would results in households living in the same type of housing in spite of their increased 
income.   
 
Figure II.1 shows that a similar proportion of households who were living in slums/challis in 
2001 are also living in slums/challis in 2011 in spite of a large increase in nominal income8. 
However, if we take into account the demographic conditions in slums (higher natural growth 
rate, higher rate of in-migration) it is clear that quite a number of slum/challi dwellers must have 
“escaped” from their slum into higher standard housing. If it was not the case the proportion of 
slum dweller in the total population would have increased (as it appears to be the case in 
Mumbai). For the slum households whose increased income allowed them to move out of a slum, 
it is likely that they have moved to the older part of the housing stock, many in the old city, 
which is cheaper and often more centrally located than the newer apartments in the more distant 
suburban areas. 
                                                 
8 It should be noted, as discussed later in the text, that the share of the population living in slums/challis was 
calculated independently using our mapping of slum areas combined with data on density per hectares from detailed 
surveys of representative slums and on average household size. Those computations provide us with the number of 
households living in slums/challis. The results are shown in Figure III. 2 
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Figure II.2 Household Income Distribution for 2011 and Housing Typologies 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
 
 
Figure II.2 roughly superimposes a simplified housing typology on the Ahmedabad households’ 
income distribution for 2011. It shows the types of housing that are close to being affordable to 
households that can now only afford to live in slums and challis. Ideally, an increase in supply 
for these types of housing at the limits of affordability should allow households with increasing 
income to leave their slums for better housing conditions. Also upgrading all slums/challis offers 
a very substantial increase of housing with an environmental quality that is broadly comparable 
or just below the low end of the formal housing market—and considerably better than the 
unavoidably squalid conditions in slums without basic neighborhood infrastructure and basic 
water and sewerage connections. Currently, however, these housing types are not fully legal 
formal housing, so the supply cannot be expanded legally. The lowest cost new formal housing 
supply is only affordable close to the median of the income distribution.   See also Section IV 
and V for illustrations and more detail on how high standards for formal housing drive up the 
cost of new supply and possible modifications.  
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Taking the current income distribution of slum/challi dwellers, it is possible to define roughly 
what housing price each income group could afford. Based on price data collected for different 
housing typologies in Ahmedabad, we analyze affordability based on a range of price / income 
ratio (PI ratios). At the very low end of the income distribution, less than INR 7,000 per month, 
households can hardly afford any expenditure on housing except for a very low rent for a small 
hut in an existing slum.  The 2011 households’ income distribution shows that about 8% of 
Ahmedabad population (or about 24% of the total slum/challi population) has a monthly income 
below INR 7,000 for whom it is difficult to afford a decent low standard home. For the other 
76% of households in slums/challis, it should be possible to find housing solutions much like 
low-cost ‘vernacular’ housing solutions that already exist in large quantities in Ahmedabad. As 
we discuss in Section IV below, this involves investing more in basic infrastructure services in 
poor neighborhoods and introducing more flexibility in standards for formal housing as currently 
defined in the General Development Control Regulations (GDCR).  
 
The analysis uses a price-to-income (PI) ratio between 2 and 3.5 for monthly income above INR 
7,000 to calculate the range of price that slum dwellers could afford on the current housing 
market (Figure II.3). Individual households vary in their capacity to save and borrow from banks 
or relatives, hence the range of PI ratio for the same income groups. 
 
For instance, for a land cost of INR 16,000/m2 and a construction cost of INR 8,000/m2, a 
dwelling of 12 m2 would cost INR 1.7 lacks if the same land use standards as much of the 
vernacular housing stock in Ahmedabad (84% coverage, 3 floors).  The same 12 m2 dwelling on 
3 floors would cost 2.4 lacks or 38% more if GDCR standards were used. In fact the GDCR 
standards penalize low buildings as they force using a large amount of land on the ground for 
large streets, open space and parking.   
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Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
Figure II.3: Households’ income distribution and affordable housing prices 
The range of affordable price for households with a monthly income between INR 7,000 and 
INR 15,000 (which includes the majority of the population currently living in slums) is shown in 
yellow shaded area in the upper part of the graph of Figure II.3.   For a PI ratio of 2 the price of 
housing should be between 1.8 lakhs to 4 Lakhs. (180,00-400,000 INR).  If small formal projects 
were allowed to be built in order to meet these target costs with varying standards depending on 
land prices and location, households currently living in slums would be able to move to formal 
housing when their monthly incomes increase above 7,000 rupees. However, the rigidity of the 
current standards freezes the supply of low-cost formal housing and condemns current 
slum/challi dwellers to stay in slums/challis when their income increases, paying always more 
for the same low quality dwelling. 
 
Figure II.3 also illustrates some important parameters regarding affordable housing policy. Since 
nearly half the population cannot afford a new formal home, the demand for any subsidized 
housing will be tremendous, and will far outstrip the capacity of the public sector. Currently, 
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only about 11 percent of the housing stock is public housing9. We estimate that the public sector 
produces about 5000 units per year, since the central government stepped up subsidies for public 
housing over the last 5 years.  Production would need to increase dramatically even over these 
higher level to meet all this need. It is also very likely that subsidized housing will not reach 
lower income groups, since there is such potentially large demand for subsidized public housing 
amongst the middle class.  
 
III. Evolution of the Population, Built-up Areas and Supply of Housing in Ahmedabad, 
2001-2011 
 
The analysis of household income distribution shows that household expenditure is growing very 
rapidly in the AMC as it is all over the state of Gujarat. Employment opportunities and a buoyant 
economy have raised aspirations for better housing conditions and the ability to spend to achieve 
them. The ability of the supply side of the market to respond to those rising demands for housing 
determine how much of that increase in spending translates into better quality, larger and well 
located housing and how much merely translates into stiffer competition and higher prices for the 
housing options available on the market. Figure II.3 showed that over the last ten years, the 
median income, although close to three times higher in nominal terms, remains very close to the 
threshold for affording to shift to purchasing a well located new formal home. 
  
Change in population 
The population of Ahmedabad has increased by 23% ,by an average of 2.1% a year, between 
2001 and 2011. By contrast the population in slums has grown by only 1.6% a year (Figure 
III.1).. Slum populations have normally a higher natural growth rate and absorb the bulk of the 
migration rate from smaller towns and rural areas.   
 
 
Figure III.1: Evolution of population and built-up areas in the AMC, 2001-2011 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
                                                 
9 Annez et al: 2010 : “Working with the Market: a New Approach to Reducing Urban Slums in India”  World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 5475 Washington DC: World Bank  
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The area of land developed between 2001 and 2011 has increased at a slower rate than the 
population, resulting in higher densities in the built-up areas in 2011 than in 2001. This increase 
in average built-up density is exceptional for a city of the size of Ahmedabad. Cross country 
analysis over cities in across the income range shows that when household income rises, built up 
densities go down (Angel 2011). Given that between 2001 and 2010 the nominal median 
household’s income has increased by 170%, this countertrend in density land development 
shows a serious land supply constraint. (It is important to note that we speak here of built up 
density only, not overall density. That figure is lower due to the fragmented nature of 
development at the periphery, see Figure III.5) This land supply constraint, however, is not 
caused by a lack of transport infrastructure – as it is often the case in other parts of India – 
Ahmedabad has developed a large number of arterial roads during the last 10 years – but by 
severe regulatory constraints that are discussed in a section below.  
 
The areas occupied by slums have barely increased by 2% over 10 years, while the slum 
population has increased by 18%. This implies that a densification of existing slums occurred 
during this period. The morphology of slums allows this densification through the occupation of 
existing open space or the subdivision of existing dwellings.  Thus contrary to some popular 
perceptions, slums and challis do not waste large tracts of valuable urban land. They are using 
this resource more and more parsimoniously as slum/challi populations expand—much more so 
than other urban development.  
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Change in slum population between 2001 and 2011 
 
 
 
Figure III.2: Estimate dwelling units produced between 2001 and 2011  
Source: Authors’ Calculations.10 
 
By measuring the changes in the different types of land use within the built-up area and the 
increase in the total population it is possible to extrapolate the number of dwelling units built in 
each type of area between 2001 and 2011 (Figure III.2). About 25,000 dwelling units were 
created on average each year between 2001 and 2011. Of these, about 6,700 units were created in 
slums/challis. So while the areas occupied by slums/challis have not increased much, about 27% 
of the new housing stock has been built in slums.  
 
The maps in Figure III.3 and III.4 show the spatial distribution of slums within the metropolitan 
area in 2001 and 2011. Heavy concentrations of slums are found in the East and North of the 
city. On the positive side, most slums are relatively small and close to existing primary 
infrastructure.  
                                                 
10 This table shows a comprehensive tally of all additions to built space in the ten year period. Categories are based 
on typologies that could be identified distinctly using Google Earth imagery and readily ground truthed on a sample 
basis. Population estimates were based on extrapolated sample densities and reconciled to cover the entire census 
measured population. The large category of mixed built up includes a variety of housing types that would be legal or 
illegal to build today such as the ‘vernacular housing discussed below, high or medium density new formal housing. 
These cannot be readily distinguished with satellite imagery. Obtaining precise estimates of the areas under these 
different types would have required a very substantial door to door survey effort that was beyond the scope of this 
study. Therefore these diverse components of mixed built up were not shown separately in the table.  
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Figure III.3: Built-up area and areas occupied by slums in 2001 
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Figure III.4: Built-up area and areas occupied by slums in 2011 
 
The map of figure III.5 shows the extension of the areas built between 2001 and 2011. The 
fragmentation of the urbanization in the Western part of the city contrasts with the relative 
compactness in the East. One of the reasons might be the difference in income between West and 
East. The higher income households in the West can better afford the transport costs linked to the 
dispersion. The large number of TP schemes in the West may also account for this dispersion as 
we discuss below. 
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Figure III.5: Location of newly developed areas between 2001 and 2011 
 
 
A further indication of tightly constrained markets comes from real estate prices in Ahmedabad. 
As is the case all over India, such information is very limited and fragmentary. However what 
data we have show price increases in Ahmedabad well in excess of the inflation rate. Indeed in 
the last four years, residential prices for the city as a whole have increased by nearly 70 percent, 
and in the last year, by nearly 30%. These rates substantially outpace inflation and last year’s 
price increase is roughly double the growth of Gujarat state domestic product. Prices in west 
Ahmedabad neighborhoods have all been in excess of doubling in the last four years—increasing 
at a rate of 20 percent per annum. Figure III.6 shows price increases by neighborhoods and 
Annex 2 provides more details on residential price developments. Amongst the 13 Indian cities 
covered by RESIDEX, Ahmedabad has the sixth highest price increase since the index was 
started in 2007. These figures should be cause for concern. Since they outpace the growth of 
basic economic aggregates and in median household spending, this means housing is ever more 
out of reach of the population at large.   
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Figure III.6: Evolution of Real Estate Prices in AMC Zones 
 
 
 
Source: National Housing Bank Residex Index. See also Annex 2 
 
 
IV. Land Management and Real Estate Policy 
 
IV A. Salient Developments in Planning and Real Estate Policy and Programs in 
Ahmedabad 
 
Ahmedabad offers fertile ground for piloting of an alternative approach to improving living 
conditions at scale in India’s cities. The AMC and AUDA have shown both a capacity to adapt 
policies to changing conditions. They have designed and financed innovative investment 
programs that respond to the needs of the broader community and treat  even the poorest 
residents as full citizens worthy of decent basic services and capable of  paying for them. Below 
we summarize three areas of successful innovation with lessons of relevance for the proposed 
strategy.  
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Evolution of Urban Planning in Ahmedabad: From Interventionist Controls to Pragmatic 
Adaptation and Progress11 
 
In the early years after Independence and the establishment of the State of Gujarat, Ahmedabad 
followed quite a typical interventionist model for town planning. In 1965, the First 
Comprehensive Development plan for Ahmedabad was drawn up. It sought to limit growth with 
a green belt surrounding the city, thus placing reservations on large tracts of private land at the 
periphery of the city. The plan defined the allowable FARs in the city at 1-1.5, and specific plots 
were tightly defined for residential, commercial and industrial use, not necessarily consistent 
with the current uses.  Many private plots were reserved for public uses. These were to be 
appropriated using the Land Acquisition Act.  However, these expansive plans were never fully 
realized, due to a lack of funds, among other reasons. The sheer political and social disruption of 
acquiring such large tracts of land made ambitious plans like these impracticable. The net effect 
of these ambitious goals underpinned by far more modest means was to create a sort of ‘property 
rights limbo.’ In strict legal terms, many lands came under the threat of state appropriation, and 
became embroiled in law suits. In these circumstances, land owners resorted to ‘grey market’ 
transactions often with poor and ill-informed households.  This created even more competing and 
unresolved ownership claims to many plots of land in the city.  
 
This state of affairs was exacerbated with the passage of the central Urban Land Ceiling Act in 
February 1976, which covered urban areas in the State of Gujarat, including Ahmedabad. Vacant 
lands notified under the act also fell into this ambiguous status where—due to the concrete risk 
of expropriation and legal action by the state, owners were pushed to avoid investing and 
optimizing the use of highly valuable resources—well located urban lands. Instead, this land was 
often sold to low-income households who purchased the land using legal procedures such as 
power of attorney, but which conferred no formal property rights or change of title. In their extra 
legal status, these neighborhoods were not provided with the  basic neighborhood infrastructure 
services that make cities livable—roads, water, sanitation, drainage and waste collection.  
 
 
Figure IV.1 : Development Plan of Ahmedabad, 1965 
                                                 
11 Drawn from Patel, Bimal 2009.  “Land Management Reforms and Future Agenda for Gujarat” Chapter 23 in India 
Infrastructure Report 2009: Land: A Critical Input for Infrastructure. New Delhi: Oxford University Press 
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Source: Sanctioned Development Plan 1965, Drawing Branch, Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation 
 
Interventionist planning policies continued in the subsequent plan for Ahmedabad sanctioned in 
1976. But by the mid-1990s, it was clear that this approach had proved a failure.  There was 
substantial illegal growth at the periphery, FSI and zoning regulations were widely ignored, and 
artificial scarcities created by these restrictions led to rapid price increases. At the periphery, 
infrastructure development moved slowly.  The main tool for urban expansion, the Town 
Planning Schemes, a form of land readjustment, took years to negotiate and execute, and 
landowners gave up their lands without benefitting from infrastructure investments, oftentimes 
for ten to twenty years. Funds mobilized under the schemes, by the time they were negotiated 
and approved, were inadequate to build the necessary infrastructure. 
  
In 2001, subsequent to the Bhuj earthquake,  the Town Planning Schemes were revamped to 
move more quickly through modest shifts that had a large impact. 
 
• The Revenue Department allowed AUDA to build the infrastructure as soon as the draft 
plan was approved, but before all the tenure issues in each plot were addressed.  
• The share of land appropriated was increased modestly so that excess lands could be 
auctioned to cover infrastructure costs.  
• Private Contractors could be hired to prepare the schemes, thus avoiding potential 
bottlenecks due to shortages of skilled government town planners. 
 
Together these changes made dramatic improvements in the speed of execution. Between 2000 
and 2009, Town Planning Schemes, vigorously pursued by AUDA and the AMC, developed 
over 200 sq km on the urban periphery vs. 100 sq km in the preceding 25 years.   
 
Table IV.1: Town Planning Schemes in Ahmedabad  
T P Schemes AUDA AMC 
Up to 1999 29 58 
1999-2010 74 43 
Total 103 101 
Total Area Covered (sq km) 153 148 
Source: Urban Planning Cell, Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority,  
Ahmedabad Urban Planning Cell, Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation 
 
The Development Plan for 2001 also changed course.  Over 100 sq. kms of land in the periphery 
were zoned for new residential growth. Rigid reservations, such as the green belt designation, 
were lifted. Appropriation of private land for public purposes was abandoned, replaced by more 
proactive use of the Town Planning Schemes.12 50 percent of reservations not yet acquired were 
de-reserved.  The FSI limit in the city was also raised—albeit quite modestly.   
 
  
                                                 
12 Balleney, Shirley and Bimal Patel. 2009.  “Using the ‘Development Plan—Town Planning Scheme’ Mechanism 
to Appropriate Land and Build Urban Infrastructure” Chapter 24 in India Infrastructure Report 2009: Land: A 
Critical Input for Infrastructure. New Delhi: Oxford University Press  
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Investing in Ahmedabad’s Low-Income Neighborhoods: The Slum Networking Project 
 
Ahmedabad has a long history of programs to provide basic services to the poor. Even before 
independence, the Ahmedabad local government focused, albeit sporadically, on large programs 
for improving environmental conditions in low-income neighborhoods in the old city and the 
chawls.13 From the 1970s, the AMC has sponsored low-cost programs that help households 
obtain in house water connections and toilets at a modest cost. However in the mid-1990s, 
Ahmedabad—without prodding or sponsorship either from the center or the state-- embarked on 
a home grown ambitious and comprehensive program to improve whole neighborhoods as a 
community effort bolstered by strong government support. 
 
The Slum Networking Program (SNP), started in the mid-1990s, was successful in establishing a 
model that worked at scale, benefitting over 14,000 households. The model comprised the 
following features: 
 
• Provision of seven basic services based on consultations with beneficiaries: water (in-
house connection), underground sewerage connection to each house, in house private 
toilet, roads, solid waste collection,  storm water drainage, and street lighting. The total 
cost of these services in the late 1990s and early 2000s averaged INR 22,000 (<$US 500) 
per household. 
• Beneficiaries contributed roughly 10 percent of costs (The Municipal Corporation 
lowered the share from the originally proposed 33 percent.) Organizers report that 
beneficiaries would have contributed more. Indeed many were incredulous that such a 
package would be provided for such a small contribution. It was not uncommon to pay 
INR.5000 just to get an illegal water line.  
• The program offered scope for local politicians to assist their constituents. They could 
pay up to one half of the beneficiary contribution provided they did so for all households 
in a given community.  
• NGOs were mobilized to organize CBOs in each slum.  These were responsible for 
collection of contributions, work out a revised site plan acceptable to the community to 
accommodate infrastructure, and coordinate demolitions by the households themselves 
(Some households lost part of their housing units. However, negotiations across the 
NGOs, the community and the corporation resulted in design standards that minimized 
such demolitions.) A fee per household was paid to the NGO by the Corporation to 
defray their organization costs14.  
• The community supervised the quality of the works, and had the final sign off for 
disbursing their share of costs. Beneficiary contributions were collected in an escrow 
account that only the CBO had authorization to release once they were satisfied with the 
completed works.  
• Women’s involvement and engagement in making the program work was recognized, 
with women’s name coming first on title and on utility bills when SEWA Bank financed. 
• Households covered by the program received a ten year non-eviction guarantee from the 
Municipal Corporation, but did not receive clean tenure for their land parcels—a clear 
impossibility in many cases. 
 
                                                 
13 Spodek, Howard. 2011. Ahmedabad: Shock City of  Twentieth Century India Bloomington: University of 
Indiana Press 
14 Unfortunately, these payments to NGOs were often delayed and sometimes not paid at all. This approach, along 
with the requirement that NGOs finance 30 percent of the community organization costs undermines the scalability 
of the program.  
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The partnerships in the program had many advantages:  
 
• The participation of the NGOs was critical for building the trust of the slum households 
to contribute to a scheme. Unfortunately,   slum dwellers are commonly approached by 
people promising service connections against payment. But the promises either do not 
materialize or the services disappoint. The presence of a well-established NGO that 
potential participants could visit or whom they already knew, made a big difference.  
• The on-site supervision of the beneficiaries led to better quality works, less pilferage, and 
rejection of substandard building materials.  
• The communities reported illegal service connections to the authorities, and they paid 
their property taxes after the upgradation. The service providers, including the electricity 
company (not part of the upgradation) reported increased revenues as a result.  
• The households benefitted most significantly in terms of reduced health care expenditures 
and lost work time. On average, women gained 1-2 hours per day from time no longer 
spent queuing for water.  Hygiene standards (frequency of bathing and washing of 
bedding, etc.) improved significantly and open defecation (particularly burdensome for 
women who need to seek privacy) was eliminated.  
• House values and rents increased substantially. Considerable investments have been 
made in adding stories15, improving housing quality, and building low-cost informal 
rental units in the improved slums. Some beneficiaries have sold their homes and traded 
up within the slums. Others have sold out their slum home and purchased a low-cost 
formal home. Slums improved over six years ago remain well maintained and building 
continues to boom in these informal areas.  
• In Eastern Ahmedabad there were no sewer lines prior to the project. To accommodate 
the SNP, the corporation extended sewer services to this part of the city.  
 
 
Lessons for the Future 
 
It was not possible to upgrade slums on public lands other than those of the municipal 
corporation because central or state agencies did not wish to cooperate, particularly in providing 
a ten year no-eviction guarantee. Even today, because of refusals to provide the necessary no 
objection certificate, it is impossible to upgrade slums on centrally owned land, even without any 
promise of tenure.  Means to address these limitations are discussed in Section V below. 
  
The communal violence in 2002 reduced the momentum of the program. A more lasting 
constraint has been the introduction of alternative, highly subsidized housing programs under the 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) established in 2005. This 
program has diverted government attention from the scalable and cost –effective SNP approach.  
It is clear from the levels of prevailing market prices, and from past experience of affordable 
formal housing provision--be it the center, the state, the AMC or private developers—that 
government sponsored new formal housing cannot be produced at the scale in required for 
today’s large population living in slums and chawls. Today, even after AUDA has substantially 
accelerated its building program to about 5000 houses per year, only about 11 percent of the 
housing stock is public16. No slum redevelopment schemes have been fully negotiated, much less 
                                                 
15 Contrary to what some might expect, none of the houses in areas improved under the SNP collapsed in the 2001 
earthquake. Modern formal housing suffered more damage. Advice from NGOs  like MHT SEWA on safe building 
techniques may have contributed to this positive outcome.  
16 Annez et alia: 2010 
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completed, and the provision of low-cost housing through reservations, to the extent it is 
monitored and measured, falls short of the stipulated production.17   
 
Promises of government provision of formal affordable housing cannot be met for the over four 
lakh (422,000) households in slums and chawls. It is neither feasible nor affordable.  Relying on 
such promises draws government energy and managerial resources from less glamorous but more 
cost effective slum improvement programs that offer such tangible benefits to their communities 
and their neighbors—and it creates unrealistic expectations in communities. As we show below 
in Section V, Ahmedabad could achieve dignified and decent housing for all if it took strong 
steps to build a multi-pronged, low-cost housing program, with its own home grown initiative the 
SNP as the foundation that could provide results at scale—reinvigorated with strong support 
from government. More complex programs like slum redevelopment may come up in some 
areas. Excess demand for whatever public housing the government builds will continue and 
make it hard for the poor to gain access. Providing a guarantee that the AMC will upgrade all 
slums and challi nieghborhoods can create a stock of modest but dignified housing for the many 
households who cannot afford more—and who can improve their homes but cannot create the 
network infrastructure that will make their neighborhoods healthy and safe places to live.  
 
Figure IV. 2 Neighborhood Improvements under SNP
 
 
 
Source: Self Employed Women’s Association Mahila Housing Trust 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
17 Deuskar, Chandan. 2011. “Town Planning Schemes in Gujarat”. Massachusetts Institute of Technology  Master’s 
Thesis Department of Urban Studies 
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From Public Lands to Public Goods—Ahmedabad’s Creative Disposition of Public Lands 
AUDA Land Auctions in Town Planning Schemes 
 
As mentioned earlier, when AUDA revamped the Town Planning Scheme mechanism in 2001, it 
introduced a mechanism for self-financing the infrastructure in the scheme.  As with all public 
infrastructure programs, some private land was taken for rights of way, public facilities like 
schooling, etc. The town planning scheme’s equitable approach to the taking of private land—
requiring all land owners to sacrifice some land for public infrastructure, was just one of the 
innovative features of the schemes. Under the old schemes, an impact fee was levied to fund the 
infrastructure. As with most taxes and levies, this was unpopular, difficult to collect, and 
ultimately yielded meager financial resources. The revamped TP schemes also took a small 
percentage of the private land for creating saleable well serviced plots with clean title. These 
plots were auctioned off for very substantial prices because of these very attractive attributes. As 
a result, the recent TP schemes dramatically accelerated infrastructure investments, notably the 
new ring road sanctioned in 2002 and now partially completed. 
 
Table IV.2 below summarizes the impressive new infrastructure investments made by AUDA in 
the last 10 years, while Table IV.3 outlines land appropriated for auction under TP schemes. 
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Table IV.2: Key Infrastructure built by AUDA between 1999 and 2010 
 
Infrastructure Proposed Length/ 
Coverage  
Expenditure 
Rs (Cr) 
Roads 1472 km 825 
Water Supply Network 144 sq km 80 
Water Treatment  Plant  
(Not Included in D.P) 
275 MLD capacity at 
Jaspur 
106 
Sewerage Network 144 sq km 83 
Sewerage Treatment Plant 
(not included In D.P) 
At Vasna 106.9 
Sewerage Treatment Plant 
and terminal station 
At Vinzol 36.8 
Storm Water Disposal 144 sq km 101 
 
Source: Urban Planning Cell, Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority, Ahmedabad 
 
Table IV: 3 Land Appropriated in all TP Schemes in Ahmedabad, 2010. 
 
No. Land Allotted to 
Appropriate 
Authority 
  
AMC 
  
AUDA 
  
Total 101 Nos. of T.P.S for 148.7 
sq km  
Total 103 Nos. of T.P.S for 153.8 
sq km  
Total Area in sq 
km. 
%Age 
(AMC) 
Total Area 
in sq.km. 
% Age (AUDA) 
1 Roads 17.78 11.69 21.79 14.2 
2 Schools  0.85 0.57 1.01 0.7 
3 E.W.S.H 2.89 1.94 4.53 2.9 
4 Salable Plots  3.64 2.45 12.06 7.8 
5 N.C./ P.U. / Others 5.54 3.72 4.69 3.1 
6 Gardens, O.S., PG 2.57 1.73 4.45 2.9 
7 Total Land to A.A. 33.27 22.38 48.53 31.6 
8 Private F.P. Area 115.4 77.6 105.3 68.4 
Source: Drawing Branch, Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad Drawing Branch, Ahmedabad Urban 
Development Authority, Ahmedabad EWSH-Economically Weaker Section Housing, NC-Neighborhood Center, PU-
Public Utilities, OS-Open Space, PG Playground, AA-Appropriate Authority, ie, Municipal Corporation, 
Development Authority or other agency designated by the Town Planning Act.  
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The Sabarmati River Project: Using Public Land to Create Quality Public Spaces 
 
Civic leaders in Ahmedabad had nurtured the idea of creating high quality public space on the 
riverfront in Ahmedabad for long years, starting with plans drawn up in the 1960s with the help 
of distinguished international architects. When the dam constructed at Baroi in 1976 transformed 
the Sabarmati’s flow from seasonal water availability during the monsoon to a continuous flow, 
it became possible to move on from ideas to designs and plans. Once the river became perennial, 
it was possible to undertake land reclamation by building embankments. In 1997, the Sabermati 
Riverfront Development Company was formed as a special purpose vehicle to execute an 
ambitious long term project to transform the riverfront. Reclaimed along the riverfront would 
offer all the amenities of prime waterfront land, and could constitute a public realm along both 
sides of the river comprising public promenades, parks, and informal markets. At the same time 
the works could improve the river’s flood carrying capacity and even out and protect the very 
irregular unstable banks that characterized the Sabarmati’s meander through Ahmedabad.  
Interceptor sewers embedded in the reclaimed land  would  capture untreated sewage coming 
through the storm water drainage lines and divert it to a sewage treatment station downriver, thus 
making the environment much cleaner and more agreeable. This creative investment concept 
compensates for the uneven coverage of sewerage networks common in many Indian cities. 
Another very important, but also controversial project component, involved relocation of the 
population of an estimated 14,000 households living in the slums on the riverbanks, subjected to 
regular seasonal flooding. They were to be moved to basic public housing as nearby as 
possible—and many, but not all, have been successfully relocated as of this writing.  As of this 
writing, the heavy engineering, interceptor sewers, and embankment work have been completed, 
and 200 hectares of riverfront land have been reclaimed. Redevelopment of the city around this 
riverfront will, of course, be a long-term process.  
 
Clearly the public at large and nearby areas of the city would benefit greatly from this project. 
However, if the project focused on creating public goods such as parks open to the public at no 
cost, no private sector investor would step in to build and finance such a project. The city was in 
no position to borrow for this investment, and even if financing were found, the project would 
not generate revenues to pay back a loan or a municipal bond.  The project cost was substantial. 
Today, it is estimated at roughly Rs. 800 crores (about $200 million18).  However the value to the 
general public and to neighboring areas was also substantial. A compromise was found. The 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) obtained an agreement from the Government of 
Gujarat to cede the property rights over the reclaimed river bed to them. A small fraction, 
currently estimated at 15% of total reclaimed land was put aside for future sale upon project 
completion. The estimated market value of this land is sufficient to cover all project costs, 
including the relocation of the residents there. During construction, the AMC mortgaged other 
lands to obtain loans, and later, as the works progressed, the mortgages were shifted to the 
reclaimed lands earmarked for future sale. With judicious use of public land, resources were 
mobilized to provide infrastructure that made the river itself cleaner and transformed the 
riverfront area into a public space for all to enjoy. Standing on the principle that no public lands 
should ever be sold to private parties would have meant accepting the status quo for a long time 
to come.  That status quo meant that all high value riverfront lands would stay in the hands of 
well to do private parties and inaccessible to the public other than the shifting population who 
lived in squalid and dangerous conditions in the slums. The compromise of carving out some 
valuable commercial space in the reclaimed area generated the finance essential to making this 
investment in free access public amenities and environmental cleanup possible. 
 
                                                 
18 At Rs. 50 per US dollar 
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IV B. Constraints on the Supply of Housing in the AMC today 
 
As is to be expected in an economy as dynamic as Ahmedabad’s, experiencing rapid growth of 
incomes and purchasing power for many, along with continued migration and population growth, 
real estate and land management policies need to be recalibrated to meet today’s demands. Our 
assessment of the real estate market developments show that a substantial share of the population 
must continue to live in substandard housing because formal housing is unaffordable. Across the 
market, housing is more costly than it need be. Government regulations and processes make it 
very costly and slow to provide any new formal housing. Uncertainties in the regulatory and 
property rights system restrain the level of investment in housing—be it in the city center or on 
the urban periphery. The natural result of such restraints is high prices—for villas, low quality 
apartments or a room in a slum. Just as the license raj made imported goods scarce and 
expensive, and items like telephones nearly impossible to get, so do many well intended 
interventions in real estate and land markets unduly restrict what the private market can offer. 
Twenty years ago, telephones, controlled by government, were unaffordable and unobtainable 
for most households. Today, the private sector—not the government—has provided cell phone 
service so inexpensive that most urban households have access.  Even though well to do 
households consumer more and better services— basic telephone connectivity is very 
widespread.  A similar process of unleashing lower cost private supply could be achieved for 
housing. The most important constraints observed in the Ahmedabad housing market, based on 
our assessment, are discussed below: 
 
Constraints on Developing Land at the Urban Periphery (Greenfield Development) 
 
While TP schemes and rezoning under 2002 DP have opened up zoning of new urban lands and 
provided the infrastructure to support urbanization, these benefits are underutilized. The DP of 
2002 created 127 sq km of new zoned urban space. However, in ten years, only 27 sq km of this 
space --one fifth of the newly zoned urban land --has been developed in ten years. TP 
schemes have covered a large percentage of these newly zoned urban areas thereby providing 
basic infrastructure for urban development. As such, lack of infrastructure is not the reason that 
80 percent of that serviced land is unused. If housing prices were stable or declining, one might 
assume that this is because supply of urban zoned land has outpaced demand. If densities in the 
peripheral areas were low, then this might suggest a surplus of developable land. But, this is not 
the case.  Land and housing prices are rising quickly all over the AMC area, and the densities in 
the peri-urban areas, already exceptionally high by international standards, are on the increase. 
(See Figure III. 1) As can be seen in Figure III.5, much of the new development on the periphery 
is highly fragmented even in areas with good road infrastructure built under TP schemes.  All of 
these factors indicate that serviced land zoned for urban development is not the binding 
constraint on supply.  
 
Figure IV.3 illustrates a clear constraint on the supply of housing at the periphery—the multiple 
approvals and costs required to turn serviced urban zoned land into approved plots with legal 
housing—even after the infrastructure has been provided in the early phase of the TP scheme. 
The streamlining of the TP scheme process following the earthquake in 2001 was a very 
significant reform. It made it possible to build and finance the infrastructure in a TP scheme 
before regularization and rural urban conversion of every parcel is complete. However, it takes 
years to complete the plot by plot approval that regularizes fully the new urban use and building 
of housing on each parcel. Figure IV.4 shows that no TP scheme commenced since 2003 is fully 
complete in this sense—and it suggests that the approval of urban rural conversion and final plot 
boundaries are currently the bottlenecks—at steps 7 and 8.  
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Clearly many parcels have been built nonetheless. Many of these may be the parcels that got 
approvals and rural urban conversion early on or those whose new boundaries have shrunk but 
do not overlap with the old boundaries of other landowners. In the latter circumstance, the risk of 
a boundary dispute is low and owners may choose to invest even before full formalization.  
However, for other plots whose boundaries are significantly displaced and overlap with the old 
boundaries of other properties, the newly created parcels remain in limbo as it takes years to 
complete the approval of the new boundaries under the scheme. Until those new boundaries are 
approved, the risks of any substantial investment in housing are very high, probably too high for 
any but the largest and most powerful investors.  
 
Figure IV.3:  Process for Conversion of Rural Land already Zoned for Urban Development 
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Figure IV.4 Progress of Town Planning Schemes Started under the new DP Since 2003 
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Constraints on Brownfield Development  
 
The difficulties of developing lands are the periphery of the city could be expected to make 
redevelopment of existing urban areas more attractive, and the supply of new and better housing 
could arise from this source. Our diagnosis indicates that this is taking place to some extent. One 
source is densification of existing slums and challis. Between 2001 and 2011 the area under 
slums challis and gamtals has barely increased—0.4 sq km, (See figure III.1)--while the 
population in these areas has increased by 18 percent. Prior to the Development Plan approved in 
2002 and the appeal of the Urban Land Ceilings Act in 1999, government declared land 
reservations such as reservations for affordable housing, and thus created areas where existing 
land use was illegal and subject to confiscation by the state. While owners often contested these 
takings in the courts, the land itself could not be used for legal occupation during the years or 
decades it would take to resolve the legal dispute. Nonetheless these lands could go onto the 
‘grey market’ in semi-legal sales for informal use such as slum dwellings19. Reforms that have 
eliminated these regulatory takings have for all intents and purposes eliminated this flow of 
contested land into the informal market. It is well beyond the scope of this study to determine 
how much slum land has been affected by such reservations, and the role reforms have played in 
reducing the expansion of slums over the period. We merely note that the de minimus expansion 
of the land area under slums has coincided with the reforms that stopped new regulatory takings.  
                                                 
19 MHT SEWA has documented cases of legal reservations on land that slum dwellers currently occupy and bought 
informally from the legal owners. However the identification of government claims and reservations is a time 
consuming and expensive process involving visits to multiple offices and authorities, and must be conducted on a 
plot by plot basis. It took over 18 months with the help of a lawyer with real estate expertise to make an initial 
assessment of ownership issues and their relation to regulatory reservations for one plot.  
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Formal redevelopment of brownfield land is far more complicated and costly than the informal 
densification we have documented for slums. Figure IV.5 illustrates these complexities. The 
uniform and low maximum FSI of 1.8 in Ahmedabad greatly constrains how much incremental 
saleable floor space can be obtained through re-development, as much existing formal 
development is fairly close this level. The transaction costs and attendant uncertainties in passing 
through the formal process of redevelopment are too high to be covered by marginal increments 
to floor space. As a result, little redevelopment takes place, and this potential source of 
incremental housing is thereby greatly limited.  
 
 
 
 
Figure IV.5: Process for Brownfield Urban Redevelopment 
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Figure IV. 6: Built Up Density Profile in AMC 1991-2001  
 
 
Source:  Alain Bertaud 
 
Maximum FSI may be the most significant constraints in the favorable cases where ownership of 
the land is clear and title is uncontested.20 However, for many of the plots even in developed 
urban areas, other constraints may also make it costly or risky to redevelop. Developed lands 
whose existing use was compromised at any point due to changes in zoning, reservations for 
green belts, low-cost housing, notified ULCRA reservations or failure to convert to urban use are 
likely to have been subject to grey market transactions that created competing ownership claims 
on the land. Anyone wishing to invest in major redevelopment would need to resolve these 
ownership disputes, which are notoriously slow to be adjudicated in the courts.  
 
When property rights are compromised in this way, the risks to investors wishing to redevelop 
this land or improve the structures on the land are high—be they developers seeking to build 
high quality apartments or households wishing to get a mortgage to invest in a better home. The 
investment could be tied up in litigation amongst those claiming ownership rights. Construction 
finance or mortgages will be very difficult to obtain.  These risks create a very adverse 
environment for investment to supply new housing.  
 
                                                 
20 This discussion draws heavily on Bhatt and Patel (2010) “The Tenure Problem: What does it really mean?” 
Manuscript January 2010, and Bimal Patel, Rajendra Joshi, Shirley Ballaney and Matthias Nohn. 2010 “Slum 
Planning Schemes A Statutory Framework for Establishing Secure Tenure and Improving Living Conditions in 
Indian Slums” Manuscript August 2010.   
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The costs of clarifying ownership and cleaning up any outstanding regulatory reservations and 
obtaining rural urban conversion in resources, time and uncertainty in the process are often 
prohibitive, even if there is no corruption encountered along the way. As in the case of 
Greenfield development in Figure IV.3, various State and local departments must provide 
information and approvals once the ownership disputes are resolved.  For low-income 
households, the burden is particularly heavy. For example, if, as is likely,  their existing home is 
not up to the exacting standards of the GDCR (see below), it must be demolished and a 
substantial fine (Rs. 13 lakh or Rs. 1.3 million) before applying for conversion to urban 
status.  These costs place further impediments in the way of building a modern high quality and 
affordable housing stock in Ahmedabad.  The system is so complex and opaque that it would be 
extremely costly and time consuming just to assess the extent of land where ownership is 
compromised in this way. But casual observation, anecdotal evidence, and the premia paid for 
lands with clean title sold by AUDA strongly suggest that it is a significant part of the stock.  
 
The high cost of regularizing ownership has blunted the effect of earlier land use reforms, and 
other developments such as increased availability of housing finance. While reservations such as 
ULCRA, the green belt and development restrictions are no longer placing new areas in limbo, 
the legacy of earlier measures remains because of the welter of competing claims created while 
these reservations were in place. Those lands will not be freed up to provide much needed 
housing until there is an expeditious and predictable mechanism to clean up competing claims to 
land tenure and allow grandfathering of structures that do not satisfy today’s high building 
standards, but which do meet very basic standards for safety and health. Patel et alia (2010) have 
proposed a consensual mechanism as an alternative to formal litigation, much as TP schemes 
offer a consensual alternative to government land expropriation. The goal of such a mechanism 
would be similar to bankruptcy law—establishing rules for freeing up assets that would 
otherwise remain frozen due to prolonged disputes over competing claims. Even though all 
claimants don’t get everything they might be able to claim, an expedited process allows 
legitimate claimants to get some fraction of their claim in relatively short order.  
 
 It has been argued that TP schemes work because they are underpinned by the basic principle of 
fairness and they offer flexibility to address competing claims in a transparent rules driven 
framework. They allow all landowners to give up something (unserviced land) for something 
more valuable (less land with good infrastructure). Likewise a consensual expedited tenure 
dispute resolution mechanism could allow all claimants to gain some share of the value of a plot 
with clean tenure today by giving up a claim to all the value that might only eventually be 
awarded to them years in the future after a prolonged legal process.  A reform offering a 
mechanism for unlocking land frozen in disputes and ambiguous ownership claims could 
dramatically accelerate the modernization of the real estate market and offer thousands of 
low-income households a chance to become legal homeowners and the autonomy to invest 
in their well being.  
 
Since administration of property rights to land is primarily the responsibility of the state, the 
form that such a reform would take depends on the legal and regulatory framework in each state. 
Moreoever such a reform would have to be driven by the appetite in any given state for 
expedited solutions to disputes through consensual mechanisms and local preferences for dispute 
management. For these reasons, putting forward a single legal blueprint for reform is both 
premature and unrealistic, although Patel et alia (2010) sketch out the broad lines of what such a 
system could look like. What is essential today is to recognize the high social and economic cost 
of protracted urban land disputes and the scope for reducing them by providing expedited 
processes. Without a system such as this, many plots in urban areas cannot benefit from the 
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substantial investments for improvement and redevelopment that the market may dictate, but 
which the current ownership framework make highly risky and ineligible for formal financing.   
 
Government Regulations Requiring Consumption of Land 
 
The discussion above describes government policies and procedures that make it difficult and 
costly to obtain land for development; this section discusses a set of regulations that force a high 
consumption of land per unit of floor space provided.  What households want is living space—a 
roof over their head—not necessarily raw land. Having made land expensive, government also 
limits the ability to economize on land when producing housing space. These regulations all have 
acceptable goals. Typically, their rationale is based on quality of life considerations, privacy, 
local environment, preservation of views etc. However, especially in a fast growing economy 
which has difficulty expanding access to land or wishing to contain urban sprawl and a large 
low-income population, the effects are the opposite of what is intended. The key to the 
unintended effects lies in affordability. If, as is the case in Ahmedabad, only 50 percent of the 
population can afford a new formal home, much of the expansion of the housing stock takes 
place informally—where these regulations don’t matter.   
 
Maximum FSI 
 
Low uniform maximum FSI even in the city center forces more Greenfield development at the 
urban periphery—pushing the pressure for developable land into the periphery where the delays 
in rural urban land conversion make themselves felt. See Figure IV.6 showing that the density 
profile already flattened between 1991 and 200121. 
 
The practice, common in India, to impose a uniform maximum FSI to an entire city has many 
negative impacts. This practice forces the consumption of land in less desirable suburban areas 
and it decreases the area of floor space that can be built in areas where there is a high demand for 
high quality high density urban development. But not allowing higher maximum FSI in non-
residential areas, it intensifies the competition between households and businesses for well-
located land. While businesses may happily sacrifice a spacious, bucolic environment for an 
efficient well designed business centre, uniformly low maximum FSI forces them to consume 
open space they don’t want or need. This drives up the price of open space everywhere, and 
raises the costs of these amenities to households.  In aggregate low maximum FSI increases the 
land required for housing and commercial development, and drives up its price—thereby driving 
up the cost of any housing—since they all need land.  
 
Beyond its substantial impacts on housing affordability, the current maximum FSI policy affects 
the structure of the city in undesirable and possibly unforeseen ways. Figure IV.7 shows for 
example that some of the lowest densities in the city are in the heart of the central business 
district (CBD) on the west side of the river. The modern service sector CBD that emerged in the 
1980s along Ashram road around Nehru bridge is now anemic because the low FSI doesn’t allow 
the construction of a modern CBD.  Instead, small office and commercial centers are being built 
in suburban areas along ring roads and radial roads. By failing to distinguish between 
commercial and residential land, the current 1.8 FSI imposed on Ahmedabad contributes to 
dispersing commercial activities into distant suburbs. This dispersion of business and 
commercial activities will have consequences for the modernization of Ahmedabad’s transport 
system.  
 
                                                 
21 This analysis can be updated to 2011 once ward level population data are available from the 2011 census.  
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The current density of Ahmedabad (262 p/ha) is quite high by international standards. This 
density is not compatible with individual transport as the dominant transport mode. The 
minimum necessary road space required for parking and moving a car at 30 km/h would simply 
not be available when, say, 30% of trips will use an automobile. Mass transit will be a necessity 
for continued mobility in the city, and the AMC has already started the process through 
investments in the Bus Rapid Transit System (BRTS).  But making the shift to mass transit will 
not be straightforward given the land use patterns now being established. Efficient transit 
systems require not only high densities but also concentration of trip destination. That requires 
CBDs that are dense in jobs and commercial activities. The uniform FSI prevents the formation 
of CBDs that could be the focal points of a modern mass transit network. The dispersion of jobs 
along suburban roads, which is the natural response to the current FSI regulations, will destroy 
the viability of a mass transit system. Annex 4 discusses some of the longer term unintended and 
undesirable consequences that may be created under the current regulatory framework for land 
use.  
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Figure IV.7: Ahmedabad Built Up Densities in 200122 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
 
General Development Control Regulations (GDCR) 
 
The GDCR currently in place imposes a large number of different requirements on housing that 
raise costs and limit choices for households. Each regulation is put in for well-intentioned 
reasons—respecting boundaries with neighbors, providing open space, offering plenty of parking 
to avoid congested roads etc. However, taken in their totality, these individual standards 
make housing more costly by requiring more land per unit of living space—and land is the 
most expensive input to housing.  
 
It is clear that the land use standards applicable in a number of illegal but now formalized and 
serviced subdivisions, provide living conditions that are quite acceptable or are even desirable 
for a large part of the population. We refer to this housing (see Figure IV.8 for examples) as 
vernacular housing. It makes up a substantial share of the existing housing stock, but it would 
now be illegal to build such housing because it does not meet all the GCDR regulations. The 
market price of pucca23 housing found in such subdivision ranges from Rs 2 lakhs24 to 12 lacks 
                                                 
22 Once census data by ward for the AMC are available, this computation can be updated for 2011.  
23 Pucca refers to construction using durable materials like brick and cement rather than mud or straw, for example. 
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and above, depending upon location. This is to be compared to the Rs 8 lakhs and above found in 
new formal subdivisions adhering to the GDCR in more distant areas. 
 
This vernacular housing, as can be seen in Figure IV.8c constitutes a pleasant, if modest living 
environment, and is in no sense, a squalid slum. Land use surveys have shown that the great 
majority of the population of Ahmedabad (about 80%) is currently living in settlements that use 
land in way that differs significantly from the minimum standards established by law. Figures 
IV.8a and b show drawings of actual developments following patterns very common in 
Ahmedabad based on Google Earth images. Figure IV.9a is a layout proposal for a new 
development following the current GDCR to build affordable housing. Table IV.4 shows some 
of the key indicators for the three types of development. 
 
Table IV. 4 Key Indicators for Vernacular and GDCR housing 
 Vernacular Narol Naroda Rd. GDCR Model Modified 
GDCR 
Persons per Hectare 1958 1991 4200 
Average Living Space per 
Person 
7.7 m2 5.2 m2 5.2 m2 
Ratio of Vernacular to Others 
Living space per person 
 1.49 1.49 
Ground Coverage 75% 45% 55% 
 
 
Table IV. 4 shows that one of the important cost drivers in the GCDR is the low maximum 
ground coverage in relation to vernacular neighborhoods. Units adhering to the GCDR are not 
necessarily larger, however. Units may actually be smaller in lower end formal developments 
than in vernacular homes. Also it is worth noting that low ground coverage limits in the land use 
regulations do NOT necessarily reduce the density of persons per hectare.  Density is roughly the 
same between the GDCR model and the vernacular developments we compare.  Broadly 
speaking, this means that for the same density, residents of vernacular neighborhoods can 
get roughly 50 percent more housing space using the same piece of land. The essential 
difference between these two is in ground coverage not density.  
 
The modified model in the last column of Table IV.4 shows the limitations of marginal changes 
to the regulations while staying within the same basic development type—four story walk ups 
with low ground coverage. As shown in Table IV.5, this approach seeks to economize on land by 
reducing parking and space between buildings while respecting setback rules for front and side 
margins, and marginally increasing plot coverage. This alternative model may still be acceptable 
to lower income households that don’t own cars, and can reduce unit costs substantially by 
building more units per hectare, as Table IV.6 shows—especially in well located neighborhoods 
where land costs are high25. However, keeping plot coverage low comes at the cost of higher 
density, which may be a concern.  
 
The most important lesson from these examples is,  however,  that the multiple requirements for 
parking, setbacks, and  limits on ground coverage have made low-cost, low rise vernacular 
housing  illegal—thus eliminating the option to substitute costly open areas for a larger living 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 1 lakh is Rs. 100,000 or roughly US$2000 at prevailing exchange rates at the time of writing.  
25 The example used here was based on a land cost for a relatively low-cost land parcel distant from the city center. 
However as shown in the table, when land prices are higher, the impact of the regulations on cost are greater—as are 
the overall costs of the home. With the current rapid rise in land prices, homes designed and built to sell for 4 lakhs 
would now have a price closer to 8-10 lakhs, so the goal of a 4 lakh home is rapidly becoming infeasible.  
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space and the amenities of low rise living. ‘Affordable’ formal housing is now required to be in 
cramped apartment living—most likely an unintended, but still very real consequence of the 
multiple design standards in the GDCR.  
 
The AMC’s large stock of well laid out vernacular housing fortunately offers good affordable 
housing options in the city. But this stock cannot now expand legally. This cuts off a path to 
meeting the needs of the large population of low and middle income households with 
growing purchase power. The GCDR sets standards that are really only suited to the highest 
income households. For example, the GCDR requires all formal apartments to build a parking 
space---whereas automobile ownership in Ahmedabad is 12 vehicles per 1000 population26, 
below the average for India of 15 automobiles per thousand persons in 2006, where India is 
ranked 127 out of 138 countries for car ownership. 27 
   
The large gap that has been introduced between this more modest standard of legacy urban 
development and new formal housing not only raises the costs of new Greenfield development. 
As discussed above, the high GCDR standards raise the costs of regularizing and redeveloping 
existing urban development for a very large share of the housing stock. Full regularization of 
tenure requires demolition of illegal structures and redevelopment according to the costly GCDR 
standards—and most likely a reduction in living space.  
 
  
                                                 
26 http://www.ourcitiesourselves.org/exhibition/city/ahmedabad referenced on November 18, 2011 
27 World Bank Development Indicators referenced 11 August 2011. Data is for 2006. Includes commercial  vehicles, 
automobiles, vans and SUVs but excludes motorcycles and other two wheelers.  
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Figure IV.8a. Existing Formal Housing  that would be Illegal for New Construction under the 
GCDR  
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Figure IV.8b. Existing Formal Housing that would be Illegal for New Construction under the 
GCDR  
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Figure IV.8c. Existing Formal Housing that would be Illegal for New Construction under the 
GCDR 
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Figure IV. 9a. Possible Plot Layout according to GCDR  
 
 
Source: Environmental Policy Collaborative and SEWA Mahila Housing Trust  
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Figure IV.9b.  Plot Layout with modifications to GCDR  
 Source: Environmental Policy Collaborative and SEWA Mahila Housing Trust   
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Table IV.5 Comparison of Key Specifications for GDCR and Modified GCDR Specification 
for More Affordable Housing 
 
BYLAWS 
DESIGN AS PER 
GDCR DESIGN WITHOUT GDCR 
      
PARKING 25% N.P 
      
COP 10% N.P 
      
DISTANCE BETWEEN TWO 
BUILDINGS MIN.15' 0" MIN. 7' 6" 
      
STAIRCASE WIDTH MIN.4' 0" 2' 9" 
      
CORRIDOR WIDTH 5' 0" N/A 
      
GROUND COVERAGE 45% 55% 
      
FRONT MARGIN 15 FT. 15 FT. 
      
SIDE MARGIN MIN. 10' 0" MIN. 10' 0" 
      
FSI 1.2 2.36 
      
ROAD WIDTH MIN. 25' 0" 12' 0" 
      
HEIGHT OF BUILDING (G+2) 30' 0" (G + 4) 45' 0" 
      
LENGTH OF BUILDING MAX 450 FT. MAX 450 FT. 
Source: Environmental Policy Collaborative and SEWA Mahila Housing Trust 
 
Note that these specifications respect all perimeters with respect to neighboring plots, such as 
side and front margins.  
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Table IV.6 Cost Comparison with marginal flexibility in the GCDR 
 
DESCRIPTION AS PER GDCR AS PER REVISED GDCR (G+4) 
PLOT AREA sq ft 81681 81681 
NO OF UNITS 330 710 
CARPET AREA sq ft 250 250 
BUILT UP AREA sq ft 336 305 
LAND COST in Rs.M. (plot 11km from 
CBD in undeveloped area) 40,000,000 40,000,000 
NO OF FLOORS G+2 G+4 
TOTAL BUILT UP AREA (SQ.FT.) 110250 223440 
LAND COST PER SQ FT CARPET AREA 485 225 
CONST COST per sq ft. 800 800 
LAND COST PER UNIT 121212 56338 
CONSTRUCTION COST PER UNIT 268800 244000 
TOTAL  COST PER UNIT Rs. 390012 300338 
SAVINGS W/ REVISED MODEL PER 
UNIT   23% 
 LAND PRICE 5 X HIGHER   40% 
 LAND PRICE 10 X HIGHER   45% 
 
 
 
To address the affordability problem of the majority of lower income households in Ahmedabad, 
it would make sense to study the land use standards that have been used by various developers in 
the past and select and adapt the types of layout that are more attractive from environmental and 
economic criteria. These models could become allowable under an expanded GDCR that offers 
different models of building by- laws in different parts of the city.  Obviously, the type of layout 
to be recommended for legalization in a central location would differ from layouts adapted to 
suburban locations. The current legal land use standards are very rigid, and are ill adapted to high 
land prices. By contrast, many vernacular subdivisions built under  more flexible regulations 
have been refined over time as developers respond to consumer tastes and preferences. By 
surveying the land use of these older subdivisions and the environmental satisfaction of its 
inhabitants, it would be possible to develop standards that are more anchored in the urban culture 
of Ahmedabad and less prisoner of abstract international norms of good housing standards. A 
policy of land use regulations that make legal formal housing unaffordable to about 40% of 
the population of Ahmedabad must be reconsidered. Our review of the housing stock in 
Ahmedabad suggests that good home grown alternatives exist and deserve a place amongst 
models allowed in the GDCR.  
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V. Immediate Improvements 
 
Clearly there is much to do to reduce the pressures in Ahmedabad’s real estate market. Serviced 
land that has permissions and title sufficient to make the substantial investments required to build 
good quality housing is in short supply. Converting existing built space to higher intensity land 
use with more surface area and good quality housing is either prevented due to maximum FSI 
regulations or it is too costly and risky to do because of the many procedures at the state and 
local level involved. At the same time, the building by laws require more expensive land than 
most of the legacy middle class housing stock so new formal housing is beyond the reach of  
most households—in spite of growing prosperity. Informal housing solutions have been meeting 
much of the new housing demand, largely by densification of existing slums, gamtals, and the 
old city. New formal housing is further and further away from the city center, which imposes 
important transport costs.  
 
Reversing this dynamic of tightly constrained and high cost new housing supply will require 
many important changes—not just stroke of the pen reforms—but also changes in the role that 
government plays in land markets, changes in procedures, institutional mandates, coordination 
across agencies, and eventually new procedures for expediting some of the bottlenecks in the 
land system. Thinking through how to effect these changes should start right now. Otherwise it 
will not be possible to keep pace with the dynamic economy and informal housing solutions will 
continue to proliferate in the face of growing prosperity. However even with rapid progress in 
these areas, the need for very low-cost housing will remain.  
 
Today, because basic environmental infrastructure services in most informal areas (slums and 
challis) are substandard. Opting for modest low-cost housing affordable for low-income groups, 
consigns them to living in squalid neighborhoods. The SNP has shown that this situation can be 
turned around. The linchpin of an affordable housing policy should be to raise the minimum 
standards of even the lowest cost housing by providing neighborhood upgrading to all 
slums and unserviced challis and gamtals. Such a program would ensure that the basic 
entry level housing available in Ahmedabad would offer even the most modest income 
groups decent homes. Once neighborhood infrastructure is upgraded, poor households have 
shown that they can improve and expand their own homes on their own initiative and to a very 
great extent with their own resources, and eventually even leave slums to live in low-cost formal 
housing. Without these basic environmental improvements, however, there is no base upon 
which an enterprising household can build.   
  
Government can do a great deal for the populations of these low quality informal areas by 
investing in them—by providing the network services and neighborhood improvements that 
individual households cannot. Making these investments a high investment priority can do 
much more for improving living conditions in the city, and can do so far more effectively, than 
relying upon building public housing in increasingly far flung areas that are not suited to most 
residents of slums and challis.  
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In this study, we have prepared a preliminary mapping all slum, chawl, and gamtal  areas, as 
shown in Figure III.4. Our rough estimate of the population of the slums and chawl areas is 1.88 
million persons, or 422,000 households28.  We have estimated the costs of the basic package of 
providing the neighborhood upgradation services to these slum and challi households, based on 
experience with the Slum Networking Program (SNP) and updated to reflect today’s market 
costs. These costs include project management, community organization and a full complement 
of seven key services in all neighborhoods: in house toilets, in house water connections, sewer 
connections, road paving, drainage, garbage collection, and street lighting. These costs amount to 
Rs. 56,000 per household in today’s prices. Table V. 1 summarizes the full costs of the program 
if executed over a five year period29.  This table shows a program phased over five years. If the 
implementation period could be reduced to three years, costs could be reduced by about 11 
percent, because of lower cost escalation in the current environment of moderate inflation 
estimated here for simplicity at 9 percent per annum, a relatively conservative figure.  We note 
that the current costs for civil works have been estimated on the basis of market prices for 
labor and building materials, not the standard rates often used for estimation purposes in 
government, which often cannot be achieved and may lead to underestimates of  costs and 
insufficient budget provisions. These costs are estimated conservatively, assuming that all slum 
and challi household would need the full upgradation complement. To the extent that households 
may have already gotten these services, they may be lower. For example, if as some believe, up 
to 60 percent of all households already have in house water and toilet facilities, the total cost of 
the program would decline by about 40 percent to Rs. 1800 crore or $360 million. 
 
Table V. 1. Summary of Total Costs of  Upgradation in Ahmedabad 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations NB. Rs. 1 crore is equal to roughly $ 200,000. Rs. 3000 crore 
is roughly equal to $600 million  
                                                 
28 The average household size is assumed to be 4.7 persons based on recent sample surveys of slums. Many gamtals 
have good services, or are in the process of upgradation. We have left them out of this initial estimate. If the city 
takes on a strategy of providing services for all as advocated in this paper, a more detailed survey and assessment 
would be needed. We understand that CEPT has started work on such a survey for slums.   
29 Please see Annex 3 for details of the costing exercise and assumptions. 
 
Ahmedabad: Slum and Chawl Upgrading - Implementation Plan
Summary of Program Cost
Data
Households to be upgraded 400000
Key Assumptions
Option= 1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
1 - 5 Year 10 15 25 25 25
2- 3 Year 25 40 35
Inflation % p.a. 9 9 9 9 9
Summary of Cost of SUP Program Rs. in Crores
Item Initiation Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total
Households upgraded 40,000 60,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 400,000
Management Structure 0.05 0.78 0.86 0.93 1.02 1.11 4.75
Project Preparation % of Civil Cost 1 2.05 3.35 6.09 6.63 7.23 25.35
Project management % of Civil Cost 2.5 5.12 8.38 15.22 16.59 18.08 63.38
31.39 51.33 93.24 101.63 110.78 388.37
0.00
Civil Works 204.92 335.04 608.66 663.44 723.15 2535.22
Total 2.10 245.57 401.69 724.69 789.91 853.12 3017.08
Survey, Household Data, Community 
Consultation & Design
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Table V.2 Per Household Upgrading Costs 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Impact on the Budget of the AMC  
 
Table V. 3 AMC Budget 2008-09 through 2011-2012 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Source: Published budgets of the AMC and authors’ calculations 
 
The Average Municipal Budget of Ahmedabad for Capital Expenditures has been around Rs. 
1300 crores in the last 3 years (2008-2011).  This provides an indication of their current capacity 
to undertake large infrastructure improvement projects. 30 The capital budget in 2011-12 is more 
than twice the average, reflecting very rapid capital budget growth over the last three years. The 
annualized project cost of the five year program is Rs. 603 crores which represents 21 percent of 
the 2011-12 capital budget, which seems a clearly manageable figure. The corresponding figures 
for the three year program are Rs. 895 crores and 31 percent respectively. There are clear 
advantages to setting an ambitious goal of completing the program in three years, but this could 
be a stretch for the AMC. It is up to them to assess whether this represents too much of a stretch 
for a rapidly growing budget. The five year implementation option appears quite manageable. As 
for the operations and management budget, experience from the SNP suggests that, since newly 
connected households pay into the network whereas they did not before, the program should not 
be a drain on the operating budget. This should be assessed in more detail. 
  
  
                                                 
30 *This does not include capital expenditure towards the Sabarmati Riverfront Development Project, since it is set 
up as an SPV and is funded through a loan from HUDCO. However, the AMC budget does include expenses for 
BRTS project related infrastructure improvements and bus procurements. The BRTS is operated by Ahmedabad 
Janmarg Limited which is also an SPV 
Per Household Cost 2011/12 Prices
Management Structure 90                 
Project Preparation % of Civil Cost 1 470               
Project management % of Civil Cost 2.5 1,175            
Survey, Household Data 7,200            
Community Consultation & Design
Civil Works 47,000          
TOTAL 55,935          
Approx. 56,000        
                all figures in Rupees Thousands
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
FINAL FINAL REVISED APPROVED BY AMC
Total Capital Income 8,762,959                                            10,365,515                          17,762,152                               28,607,000 
Total Capital Expenditure                   10,311,889                          12,950,453                          17,762,152                               28,607,000 
Total Revenue  Income             15,541,668.00                    16,169,373.00                    22,353,514.00                               31,975,350 
Total Revenue  Expenditure               9,104,426.00 11,559,960.00                                           13,494,597                               17,903,008 
Total INCOME(CAPITAL+REVENUE)                   24,304,627                          26,534,888                          40,115,666                               60,582,350 
Total EXPENDITURE(CAPITAL+REVENUE) 19,416,315                24,510,413                        31,256,749                        46,510,008                             
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Upgrading Network Infrastructure 
 
The costs discussed so far are essentially on-site local costs.  Traditionally, in India, slum 
upgradation projects have been limited to this kind of investment. This approach neglects two 
implications for infrastructure networks.  
 
First, once every household will have an individual water connection and an individual WC 
might substantially increase the demand for such services as compared to the present levels of 
service delivery. The trunk or primary infrastructure network may not have the capacity to cope 
with the demand for services at the assumed standards.  
 
Second, Ahmedabad, much like most other Indian cities, would benefit greatly from an overall 
upgradation and capacity augmentation of its network infrastructure, especially water, drainage, 
and sewerage. It has been the tradition in India’s cities to get by with the bare minimum of basic 
services of this kind and cope with the concomitant service failures as a routine of doing 
business. While most households have come to expect water only a few hours per day—
experience with pilots in Karnataka have shown that moving to 24X7 water is achievable, 
popular and people are willing to pay for it. AMC and Gujarat have shown the way to throwing 
over tradition and modernizing many areas of city management. A city-wide project to provide 
neighborhood improvements to all its informal areas is an excellent opportunity also to take a 
truly inclusive approach, and upgrade networks so that all residents of the AMC experience 
service improvements—not just those in slums and chawls---as part of the program.   
 
It would therefore be useful to assess the network capacities and plan for their augmentation 
concomitant with the slum-upgrading program. However quantification of cost of network 
augmentation has not been attempted here. Based on the above, it can be seen that AMC is 
already undertaking initiatives to improve trunk infrastructure and access to the services. About 
73 crores have been allocated in the most recent budget for upgrading existing networks. Details 
are available in Annex 3. It is fortunate that the Corporation has already started such 
improvements, and is thus gaining experience and capacity with such network infrastructure 
upgrades. This experience could provide the basis for scaling up these efforts to the city level.  
 
Providing Relocation for Households Whose Shelter Cannot Be Upgraded in Situ 
 
It is common for traditional slum upgradation plans to ignore some of the most vulnerable 
households in the city—those for which in situ upgradation is not a good option.  In the AMC, 
we have identified two types of households of this kind—those in flood prone areas around lakes 
and sidewalk dwellers. For the sidewalk dwellers, options range from homeless shelters to public 
housing, depending on their permanence in the city and capacity to live independently. In 
Ahmedabad, our estimates suggest that the pavement dweller population is fortunately relatively 
limited. More study is needed to determine how best to meet the needs of this population, and 
find effective solutions to improve their living conditions. Standard approaches such as night 
shelters have not met the needs of all the population.  
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Table V. 4 Estimates of Populations Unsuitable for In-Situ Upgradation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slum and chawl households in the path of important infrastructure development (e.g. new roads 
or widening of existing roads identified in the development plan) may be better served by 
relocation than upgradation, because their future in situ is uncertain.  However, not all road 
projects come to fruition as planned, and the land cleared by relocation for infrastructure 
improvement is prone to further encroachment until the proposed infrastructure improvement is 
completed. This implementation timeline for such infrastructure projects is not always assured as 
it depends on various factors like availability of appropriate funding etc. It makes no sense to 
relocate households until such funding is available. Furthermore, the relocation of any 
households displaced by the infrastructure should be paid for as part of the project costs.  
 
Accordingly, while noting the presence of this set of households, their relocation is not included 
as part of the project costs.  Assuming full cost of relocation within the cost of major 
infrastructure projects with high economic value has become increasingly accepted through, 
among others, experience with IFIs that developed working models for rehabilitation of all 
affected households. The MMRDA in Mumbai, for example, subsequent to a World Bank urban 
transport project, has adopted  R&R guidelines using community involvement to avoid abusive 
inclusion in rehabilitation schemes, NGOs that are trusted intermediaries, and abolishing 
punitive cut off dates for providing compensation to affected households. AMC and AUDA 
certainly have the capacity take up such a forward looking approach to rehabilitation in their own 
infrastructure projects. 
Households Potentially Unviable for Upgradation
Unsuitable for 
Upgradation
Area (Ha)
# of 
Households
1 Pavement Dwellers - 3,406               
2 Flood Prone Areas 2.31                               577                   
3 Infrastructure Upgrades 6                                    1,500              
Flood Prone Households  in Slums Near Lakes
Chandola lake Total Population 3,930               
Relocation HH 442                   
Thaltej lake Slum Pocket 1,369               
Relocation HH 101                   
Isanpur lake Slum Pocket 1,255               
Relocation HH 34                     
TOTAL 6,554               
TOTAL After  Lake Protection 577                   
# of 
Households
Lake name
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The households around the lakes offer a different set of considerations. Since the lake is prone to 
periodic flooding, it is often assumed that these households should merely be relocated, and the 
lake infrastructure upgraded as a separate matter. However, experience suggests that it usually 
makes much more financial sense to reinforce the lakeside infrastructure to reduce flooding and 
improve these slum neighborhoods in situ to avoid dislocation. According to our rough 
estimates, less than 10 percent of households would need to be relocated if infrastructure 
investments are made. One hopes that working with the community, as was the case under the 
SNP, this number could be reduced even further. This offers a substantial savings—if all lakeside 
households are relocated, this would add 150 percent to the current estimate of relocation costs 
city-wide. This incremental sum of Rs. 300-600 crores that could be saved by making the 
necessary infrastructure investments is quite substantial—representing from 10-20 percent of 
total project costs.   
 
Program Implementation Building from Experience with SNP: Scaling Up by Design 
 
Positive Lessons from SNP 
 
The Slum Networking Program was started in the mid-1990, and continued for about 10 years. 
During that time, services were provided to about 14,000 households very cost effectively and 
made major changes in the neighborhoods of many of the city’s slum pockets—as can be seen in 
Figure V.1. The homes in these slum pockets, once provided with decent neighborhood 
infrastructure, greatly increase in value due to the amenities in the environment, and bring 
households within sight of moving up to middle class housing such as that shown in Figure V. 2 
below. A number of lessons were learned in the process and these offer invaluable insights for 
the design of city scale program.  
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Figure V.1 Before and After Slum Networking in Ahmedabad 
 
Figure V. 2 Typical Lower Middle Class Housing in Ahmedabad 
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There are several important, highly positive lessons learned in the SNP:  
 
• The AMC piloted a collaborative model for working with communities and NGOs 
that has held up over many years and different municipal commissioners, showing 
that it is possible to institutionalize different ways of doing business rather than 
relying on a single charismatic leader to achieve lasting results. 
 
• This project flourished without external funding, whether from the central 
ministries or IFIs. It was a homegrown initiative of the AMC adapted to local 
capabilities and interests.  
 
• Households in slums are willing to pay for neighborhood upgradation and in house 
service delivery. Communities contributed 10 percent of project costs for the SNP—
and this contribution rate could have been double that. Prior to the program, 
individual households were paying much more for illegal individual water and sewer 
connections than the household contribution for the entire upgrading package.  
 
• Once upgrading is completed, households invest multiples of what the government 
provides to improve the quality of their homes and build additional floors. Many add 
extra rental units to their homes, one of the best sources of low-cost rental housing.  
 
• Community involvement contributed greatly to smooth and efficient execution of 
the upgrading program.  
o In most neighborhoods, the CBOs reworked plans to minimize or avoid 
altogether relocations of entire households.  
o The households themselves performed required demolitions to avoid conflicts 
with city authorities and contractors.   
o The community supervised the quality of the works and it was only upon 
community agreement as to the quality of work that final payments were made 
to contractors. 
o Storage of building materials on-site reduced pilferage and wastage. 
o CBOs formed during the construction period have taken on operations and 
maintenance of the facilities effectively. 
 
Avoiding Avoidable Constraints 
 
The SNP did face limitations. The tripartite partnership including the private sector proved quite 
difficult to sustain. The reasons for this are complex. Clearly, attempting to marry the cultures of 
two distinct organizations in the implementation of a single project proved cumbersome, slow 
and frustrating to all partners, and was abandoned. Fortunately, the program survived the 
withdrawal of the private partner.  Future programs should be streamlined and simplified to 
avoid excessive interdependencies, and instead find a responsible division of labor among the 
different parties involved. This is what worked successfully in SNP. 
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In recent years, attention has shifted away from the SNP to much more costly formal ‘affordable 
housing’ projects supported under JNNURM, and strongly subsidized by the center. As 
discussed in section 2, there will be substantial demands for such housing from households who 
do not now live in slums. Moreover, the number of households living in slums is a very large 
multiple of even accelerated public housing production.  If the center is providing such rich 
subsidies for this housing, then the State and the Corporation may not wish to refuse them. But 
the availability of these subsidies should not distract the State and the AMC from their own 
homegrown initiative, the SNP—which offers a cost effective and scalable path to well located, 
decent and dignified housing—for the over 400,000 households in slums and chawls.  
 
The center will not be in a position to provide subsidies for more than a fraction of the needs. 
Annez et alia (2010) estimate that it could cost 20-30 percent of GDP to build new housing for 
all households living in India’s slums today—not to mention accommodating the growth of this 
population (18 percent over the last ten years in Ahmedabad) . With the rural employment 
program NREGA funded at roughly 1-2 percent of GDP per annum, it is unrealistic to expect 
that multiples of that sum will be spent on subsidies for cities. Even if the massive funding 
required were available, it will also become increasingly difficult to find land for new housing 
projects as government land expropriation is coming up against political and social limits and 
market forces make it very difficult to enforce reservations for low-cost housing in private 
developments (Deusker 2011 and CEPT 2009). The further out low-cost housing moves, the 
greater the risk that this housing will either lie empty or will only be taken up by the well-off 
who can afford the time and cost of a long commute. In situ upgradation, on the other hand, 
improves living conditions where the poor live and work already. Finally, a city like Ahmedabad 
that is modernizing quickly and rapidly expanding its infrastructure may find that relocation 
housing for households displaced by new infrastructure projects may well absorb all its capacity 
to provide public housing.  
 
Recent experience in Mumbai with the in situ slum rehabilitation program has created the hope 
that instead of upgrading slums, these neighborhoods can all be redeveloped into private 
apartments by private developers at no cost to the budget. Annez et alia (2010) illustrate the 
limits of such a program for Mumbai. Given the large population living in slums in relation to 
demands for new built space, it would take a generation to provide housing for its entire slum 
population. A few will benefit, but most lose out because such programs detract attention from 
simple and cost effective investments in slum upgrading. In Ahmedabad, our analysis of a 
sample of slum pockets turns up further constraints limiting the scope for Slum Rehabilitation 
Schemes. Figure V.3 illustrates one potential but powerful physical constraint. Plot sizes vary 
considerably in slums as the graph below shows. Many of those dwellings are quite small. This 
leads to high densities, which our data suggest are growing.  When the slum pockets themselves 
are small, the ability to house all families already on site, while profitably redeveloping the 
remaining land for other purposes is quite limited. The requirement to offer a 250 sq ft (carpet 
area) apartment to all households also poses some challenges. Would the households with larger 
size dwellings, which are not the majority, but still a substantial number, accept a standard 
apartment in exchange for a larger dwelling? Would all parties accept that large numbers of  
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households with smaller dwellings—in this sample, 58 percent of the total get a valuable, larger 
apartment? Many slum pockets are so small that transit housing cannot be built on site, and 
developers are balking at the costs of renting transit housing—so residents risk being displaced 
and unhoused for the entire construction period.  These points speak to the simple impracticality 
of executing the schemes on any scale.   Our rough assessment is that no more than about 10 
percent of slums could reasonably be expected to be rehabilitated in this way. Counting on this 
scheme to be more than a small part of a broader strategy for slums and chawls would be 
unrealistic.  
 
Figure V.3 Distribution by Dwelling Size in Sample Slum Pockets  
 
 
Source : Authors’ calculations 
 
While taking up whatever subsidies the center provides and trying to exploit the opportunity that 
Slum Rehabilitation offers, AMC certainly has the capacity, technical and financial,  to execute a 
large scale slum and chawl upgradation program at the same time. AMC and the State of 
Gujarat need not make an ‘either or’ choice. They could and should do both, and in this, 
there will be help from the center with the RAY scheme. To avoid creating perverse 
incentives to hold out for larger subsidies, government should send a clear signal that 
opting for neighborhood upgradation will not compromise  eligibility for slum 
rehabilitation or allocation of subsidized EWS housing. The risks of duplication are small and 
can be managed. Government should also avoid trying to plan which neighborhoods would get 
new housing, upgradation, and in situ rehabilitation. Developers need to make a market driven 
choice for rehabilitation. Government could focus providing public housing for orderly 
relocation when absolutely necessary for infrastructure. This conservative approach will 
naturally avoid duplication, while trying to plan all these choices from above will delay benefits 
for thousands of families willing to pay to improve their lives. 
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Lessons for Moving to Scale: Creating Momentum with Robust and Reliable Procedures  
 
Those implementing the SNP found that the pace of community organization and community 
financial contributions followed a simple, compelling logic. Seeing is believing. Once one slum 
had been upgraded, CBOs formed more quickly in neighboring areas. Communities made their 
cost contributions readily once they saw work crews in the neighborhood.  Tangible results offer 
more credibility than the most finely crafted incentive schemes or communications strategies.  
 
This suggests the following measures for accelerating the pace of a reinvigorated upgradation 
program in Ahmedabad. The proposed measures could reduce the time needed to improve one 
neighborhood from 24 to 15 months. 
 
• Start working in priority neighborhoods quickly to demonstrate commitment to the 
program rather than mapping a process for the entire city up front. Working 
neighborhood by neighborhood offers natural project risk management. Any mistakes 
made in early upgradation projects can be corrected in later projects. Gains from learning 
on the job can easily be applied in later neighborhood upgradations.  
 
Unlike large projects with major interdependencies across different components, 
such as a metro or airport, neighborhood upgrading does not need intricate 
advance planning, or socio economic surveys of the entire population living in sub-
standard neighborhoods.  The overall cost and financing envelope should be 
understood with some accuracy to ensure that project can be sustained to completion. 
The basic principles of beneficiary contributions and responsibilities as well as 
commitments from the government should be understood up front.  But beyond that, it is 
unlikely that detailed project planning is worth the cost of the delays inherent in 
obtaining more precise knowledge. Informal housing in slums, chawls and pavements is 
the solution when all else fails. These solutions are inherently dynamic and subject to 
rapid change. Precise advance engineering of city-wide solutions for populations such as 
these is an illusion—and a very costly one for the households in these areas who remain 
chronically underserved while the global problem is studied in unnecessary detail. 
Neighborhood by neighborhood, these questions should be studied as upgradation 
subprojects are prepared and implemented. Initial conditions need to be documented and 
frameworks for assessing the impact of the project after completion should be put in 
place. Full station surveys and detailed engineering designs are required. But the frame 
of reference for such study is a neighborhood to be improved in the near future—not the 
city level. Thus all this important information for policy makers and program designers 
eventually can emerge during execution, rather than in a prolonged planning stage.  
 
• On tenure and security—the perfect should not be in the way of the good.  The 
scope of neighborhood upgrading should be expanded by setting aside the contentious 
question of tenure, No Objection Certificates (NOCs) or no eviction guarantees—prior 
to upgrading the neighborhood. The SNP included a 10 year no eviction guarantee. 
This guarantee could only be offered easily on lands owned by the AMC, and thus 
excluded slums on any other public lands. Unfortunately, even for those limited cases, 
the AMC was not always able to live up to the guarantee because new infrastructure 
projects necessitated some relocations in upgraded neighborhoods. Due to subsequent 
lawsuits and complaints, this guarantee has become controversial. The AMC may be 
understandably concerned about using it further. Using a no eviction guarantee 
precluded any upgradation in neighborhoods on public lands owned by other entities 
such as the State, the center and government enterprises like the railways. Private land 
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ownership ambiguities also make upgrading the chawl areas quite sensitive and 
problematic if a no eviction guarantee is provided. Together these limitations exclude a 
very significant share of underserved informal neighborhoods, thus compromising the 
objective of providing decent living conditions for all. On the other hand, given the 
experience with the SNP and the no eviction guarantee, households have understood that 
they are both unlikely to be evicted for no reason, and, de facto, a no-eviction guarantee 
may not provide full protection. We believe, based on experience in the later phases of 
the SNP, that many households will accept to pay their contribution even if they are 
required to recognize formally that they could be evicted—provided neighborhood 
upgrading is forthcoming. 
 
• The AMC has had little success in its efforts at obtaining NOCs from central agencies 
like the railways to make any kind of improvement in slums on central lands.  The 
Ministry of Housing and Poverty Alleviation (HUPA) in Government of India (GOI) 
should support the AMC and other local governments in obtaining such NOCs as part of 
its national slum upgrading program RAY31.  
 
• Build on the AMC approach to providing upgradation on the Municipal Act clause 
which allows the Commissioner to provide services to ensure the health and safety of the 
population. Experience has shown this approach to be expeditious, rapidly 
implementable, and allows many more households to be serviced.  
 
• Recognize that poor households need to manage cash flow at least as carefully as 
governments. Requiring beneficiaries to take loans based on government’s promise to 
deliver services is unnecessary. SNP experience shows that households pay as works 
progress—and defaults on beneficiaries contributions did not threaten the financial 
viability of SNP.  Thus, setting the threshold for starting contracting lower than the 80 
percent used in the SNP makes sense.  Allowing procurement to start after households 
have contributed 20 percent of their contribution manages government’s risks 
reasonably. If problems are encountered in the course of implementation, this figure can 
be revised.  
 
• The NGOs organizing the CBOs should be remunerated to cover costs. A full cost 
recovery model is the only path to working at large scale in organizing beneficiary 
communities. We are recommending their work be budgeted at Rs. 10,000 per 
household, and that funds be earmarked up front for this purpose to avoid any arrears in 
payments to NGOs which slowed down and narrowed the scope of the SNP program. 
Community organization is as crucial an input to the program as good engineering, and 
needs to be paid accordingly.  
 
• Reduce reliance on micro-finance. Qualification for a loan for the household 
contribution was a requirement for the SNP program. This is cumbersome and time 
consuming for the MFIs, the CBOs, the NGOs, and the households. Yet many 
households can afford their cost contribution without finance if spread over the 15 to 24 
month implementation period for upgradation. This amount should be not larger than 20 
-30 percent of annual household income for many slum households.  Besides being 
cumbersome and time consuming, the requirement to take out a loan imposes an interest 
burden on households that brings no benefit to project finances, since the household 
contribution is held in escrow until satisfactory completion of the works.  
                                                 
31 Rajiv Awas Yojana 
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• Build an operating model suited to the modular repetitive nature of neighborhood 
upgradation. The 422,000 households living in Ahmedabad’s slums and chawls are 
spread over hundreds of neighborhood slum pockets. To achieve fast and tangible results 
at scale, many pockets must be dealt with at a time, requiring a large number of 
engineers and community organizers over a limited period of time. However, because 
each sub-project is relatively small, they do not easily attract the attention of departments 
working on large and higher visibility city infrastructure projects. To address these 
problems, an implementation framework should encourage both specialization and scale. 
 
• Specialization can be achieved by a dedicated unit working only on these projects.  
 
o Because there would be a large demand for a relatively limited period, this 
capability could come by creating a temporary workforce, on a contract basis to 
meet the needs of the program for a few years.  
o Especially for scarce skills like engineering, this could address what is frequently 
a shortage of necessary skills in government ranks without bloating the civil 
service with posts that will later be redundant.  
o Keeping sufficient engineers on hand to approve works can speed considerably 
the flow of benefits to neighborhoods once all the investments have been made. 
Deputation of engineers from their regular departments to a specialized unit can 
provide a critical mass of engineers, and a deputation premium would make this 
otherwise unglamorous work more attractive.  
 
o Specialization of procurement of materials for the neighborhood upgrading 
program would also avoid bottlenecks in the common stores—which often 
slowed down works even when contractors were ready and willing to move 
forward.  
 
o Creating a standardized modular contract that allows lumping together a number 
of neighborhoods to be upgraded in a single contract would make neighborhood 
upgradation attractive even to the larger contractors, who tend to be technically 
and financially more reliable, and therefore speed execution while improving 
quality.  
 
o Making these modular contracts work would require an assured funding source 
so that short term budget constraints do not derail project execution.  
 
• Given all the above requirements, the special purpose vehicle (SPV) structure may be suited 
to an accelerated slum upgradation program. The procedural flexibility that SPVs provide 
would make it simpler to use these customized approaches suited to slum upgradation. The 
institutional flexibility of SPVs, especially in manpower terms, mean that an SPV could build 
up and wind down the technical labor force required without burdening the Corporation with 
staff not needed in the long term.  However, there are also concerns about ownership on the 
part of government, governance and accountability in SPVs and these deserve consideration 
as well. What is important is not the form of the institutional arrangements in an SPV, it is 
gaining the procedural and functional flexibility described above.  
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
What Does This Study Cover? 
This study has two distinct parts. One outlines an immediate ‘no regret’ investment program. The 
second discusses how to restructure government’s role in the market to offer more inclusive 
housing solutions for all.  
 
Part One: Immediate Investments for City-Wide Improvements 
1. The first part examines the investments government should make to ensure a basic shelter 
standard for all households in Ahmedabad.  The analysis starts from the premise that the 
first and most fundamental step to achieving this goal is  providing basic 
neighborhood infrastructure improvements—also known as in-situ slum upgrading 
to all informal areas in the city. These improvements include: in house piped water 
connection, in house toilets and sewer connection, drainage, paved roads, street lighting, 
and solid waste management.  
 
2. Only government can provide these network infrastructure improvements, and the 
absence of these services consigns households to squalid living conditions and presents 
an insuperable obstacle to further private investment in housing improvements. Such 
investments are simply not worthwhile without basic environmental infrastructure 
investments.  
 
3. Other programs such as providing public housing, encouraging slum rehabilitation by 
private developers, reservations for low-cost housing in private developments, may also 
be taken on, but in situ neighborhood upgrading for all must be provided. These other 
programs may be useful, although more expensive, more complex to implement and 
enforce, and not necessarily targeted to the needs of all low-income households. They 
should be complements to, not substitutes for, basic neighborhood upgrading for all. 
Plans for providing public housing should not hold back investments needed to 
bring all neighborhoods to a decent minimum standard. 
 
4. Is neighborhood upgrading for all feasible?  
 
a. Our analysis confirms that although there are over 400,000 or about 4.2 lakh 
households living in informal areas; a program to provide for upgrading for all is 
feasible and far more affordable than other options.  
b. Already the Slum Networking Program has served 14,000 households in 
Ahmedabad with these same services.  
c. Rs. 50-60,000 per household can cover all the costs of neighborhood upgrading 
including community organization. This is somewhere between one fifth and 
one tenth of the cost of providing public housing.  
d. When implemented over 5 years, such a program is affordable. A program 
covering all slum and challi households would require additional capital 
expenditures of about 20 percent over the amount the AMC is currently spending 
on capital account. If, as some estimate, 60 percent of households in challis and 
slums already have in house toilet and water facilities, these costs would be even 
lower, possibly as low as 13 percent of the current capital budget. 
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5. An inclusive infrastructure improvement strategy  should not leave out those households 
(hhs) who do not have homes at all, pavement dwellers (about 3,000 hhs) , or those who 
are living in unsafe areas subject to flooding (about 22,000 hhs) .  For the former, more 
work is needed to understand robust solutions to meet these households’ specific needs. 
For the latter category, the majority live around three lakes. Investments in flood 
mitigation works around the lakes together with neighborhood upgrading are both more 
cost effective and less disruptive to the families concerned than relocation into public 
housing.   
 
6. Basic minimum living standards should be provided to all informal neighborhoods—
including private lands and central and state lands. The Municipal Act allows the 
Commissioner to upgrade neighborhoods without affecting tenure, as part of his 
responsibility to provide for the health and safety of the population. Upgrading under this 
clause will not necessarily provide a ‘no eviction’ guarantee to slum dwellers. However,  
most households will agree to contribute to such a scheme for basic upgradation even in 
the absence of a no eviction guarantee. While it is desirable to provide security to poor 
households, requiring security as part of upgrading de facto excludes many families from 
programs to provide them with tangible and immediate improvements. This exclusion is 
very undesirable and can be avoided. Moreover, difficulties with honoring some of the 
tenure guarantees provided in the past have tarnished the reputation of in situ upgradation 
program, thus reducing commitment to community based upgrading as practiced in the 
SNP.  
 
7. An inclusive infrastructure improvement strategy should not stop at neighborhood 
upgrading alone. Adding a large number of household connections will place stress on a 
system that is struggling to keep up with the needs of a fast growing city. Such stress 
could downgrade services to households now connected and unnecessarily pit them 
against the families being connected to networks for the first time. Aggregate water 
consumption and flows into sewerage and drainage networks would surely rise if the 
roughly one third of households are added to these networks. Therefore, a substantial 
program of bulk supply and network distribution capacity improvements should 
accompany the slum and challi improvement program.  
 
8. Ahmedabad has had a very substantial experience with programs to improve services in 
slums and challis. Much has been learned that can improve the speed and effectiveness of 
implementation of an in situ slum upgradation program. Using these insights, upgrading 
more than 4 lakh households over five years becomes a reasonable, if ambitious, goal—
not one beyond the reach of the much enhanced capacity of the AMC and the many civil 
society groups working in Ahmedabad’s informal neighborhoods. However, the design of 
the program needs to simplify and build upon lessons learned from earlier efforts. 
 
9. To speed implementation, we recommend the following measures: 
 
a. Establish a dedicated unit, be it an SPV or other institutional structure,  under the 
AMC, for implementing the program. This could build on the successful 
experiences in AMC of the BRTS, the hospital, and the Sabermati Riverfront 
project. A specialized cell or SPV could take a  number of measures to make work 
progress more quickly, among others: 
i. Deputing officers with a pay premium to compensate for working on 
smaller and less glamorous projects. These premia will reflect the AMC’s 
commitment to the inclusive aims of the project.  
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ii. Avoid using central stores for purchase of materials, and tailor a 
specialized procurement system to the needs of this project. 
iii. Create bundled contracts with competitively set rates for works that will 
be repeated with many variations across many different slums. This will 
permit financially strong and competent large contractors to bid for the 
works and complete the works quickly to good quality standards.  
iv. Allow contract costing at market rather than PWD rates, which do not 
always capture price escalations and therefore discourage strong 
contractors from bidding. Creating a system only attractive to smaller, 
weaker contractors slows down progress of works due to poor contractor 
performance and financial problems. Our estimated costs reflect market 
rates, and they are still quite affordable.  
v. Permit outside contracting of specialized skills required only for the 
limited period of the project. This can reduce reliance on AMC engineers 
whose workload will not permit rapid execution and approval of a large 
number of small projects.  
 
b. Start work quickly in priority neighborhoods (criteria to be set) to demonstrate 
ability to achieve results for communities willing to work with the AMC. This 
work should start before completing comprehensive and detailed surveys of needs 
in the city. Such exercises can work in parallel. Based on this initial survey and 
the many other initiatives undertaken to pilot slum upgrading under RAY, AMC 
should be able to estimate the costs accurately enough to produce project 
documentation and obtain funding for a city-wide program. 
 
c. Adapt financial requirements for participating households so that they can meet 
their financial obligations over time, thus ensuring accountability of contractors 
and participating NGOs.  
i. Rely less on micro finance for household contributions. Requiring 
beneficiaries to qualify for a micro loan for their contribution to the 
project (Here estimated at Rs. 5000 per household based on consultations 
with community groups) slows down project implementation by 3-6 
months. If households are allowed to pay in their contribution based on the 
progress of works, as would any household hiring their own contractor, 
the need for micro-finance is much less and micro-loans can be optional.  
ii. Allow works to commence once 20 percent of the required contribution is 
paid.  
iii. Allow local MLA’s to pay up to 50 percent of the household contribution, 
provided this is paid for all households in the slum pocket/challi to be 
upgraded.  
 
d. Increase the payment to civil society organizations (CSOs) including NGOs 
for organizing neighborhood community based organizations (CBOs), 
supervising the works, and facilitating implementation to cover their costs 
fully. In the SNP, the rates were set well below the costs to the participating CSO, 
and were not always paid on time. When actual costs exceeded set rates, the CSO 
contribution became substantial. If CSOs are to be expected to organize over 4 
lakh households into CBOs for hundreds of slum pockets, they cannot be 
expected to subsidize such a large operation. Indeed, community organization at 
this scale will require the hiring of large numbers of additional staff or contractors 
at market rates. The estimated costs of the community mobilization program are 
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estimated at Rs.7,000-10,000 per household and yet the overall costs of the 
program remain manageable.  
 
10. Finally to sustain and build support for the SNP, civil society organizations and 
government may join in a public relations campaign to raise public awareness of the 
social and economic benefits of the new neighborhood upgrading project. 
 
Part Two: Addressing Structural Problems that Drive Up the Cost of Housing and Create 
Chronic Informality  
 
1. All over India, and in many other countries around the world, government is expected to 
take an active role in ensuring that affordable housing is built to meet the needs of low-
income groups. Economists would argue that there is no compelling need to subsidize 
housing, a purely private good. Income transfers, rather than housing, are seen as a better 
solution. However this is not practical and most countries provide public housing or 
incentives for private developers, such as reservations for EWS/LIG32. Ahmedabad is 
no exception. It has availed of central programs supporting construction of new formal 
homes, and the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (AUDA) has effectively 
presided over an expansion of public housing.   
 
2. In nearly all countries, however, government efforts in this domain fall well short of 
meeting needs. Budgets are limited. When formal private housing is expensive, it is 
extremely difficult to target publicly provided housing to low-income groups only. It is 
particularly difficult to address the problem through public housing when formal housing 
is beyond the reach of a large share of the population.  One must look beyond 
government programs to supply housing directly if the goal is to ensure all housing meets 
a decent minimum standard for a growing population.  
 
3. The scope for solving the problem by building new government housing is very limited, 
first because the amount of additional supply that even efficient governments can provide 
in relation to the number of households living in substandard conditions is very small. 
Second, while governments may build new affordable housing on the one hand, on the 
other hand their policies, investment programs and administration of land often make it 
difficult for anyone in either the public or private sector to provide legal formal housing 
with good infrastructure services on large scale. Put otherwise, government’s indirect 
impact on the operation of the market far outweighs their direct impact on supply by 
building houses.  
 
4. This is the case in Ahmedabad. About one third of households live in slums and 
challis, and the number of households living in slums has increased by 18% over the 
last ten years. This has happened even though the city economy is thriving and median 
income in Ahmedabad has increased to 2.7 times what it was in 2001. Median household 
expenditure based on National Sample Surveys has increased in real terms by over 5 
percent annually from 2004/2005 to 2009/2010. But available data indicate that formal 
housing prices have increased by 70 percent in the last four years, more than double the 
rate of increase of prices in the state (as calculated using the GDP deflator). So 
affordability remains a problem even in an economy of relative prosperity. Today, 
roughly half of the population could not afford to buy a well located new formal 
home.  
                                                 
32 Economically Weaker Sections and Low Income Groups 
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5. The flow of new private formal housing of all types is very low in Ahmedabad, 
probably only about 10 percent of total new production, which is itself only 2.4 
percent of the existing stock. Shifting the share of new private housing into 
‘affordable housing’ through reservations or PPP schemes such as in-situ slum 
rehabilitation will have only a very small impact on the large share of the population 
living in slums. Government produces about 5000 units per year, showing a recent 
increase due to central program subsidies. Perhaps another 2,500 units could be provided 
by reservations for low-income housing—provided these reservations are actually 
enforced.  
 
 
6. We estimate that 422,000 households live in slums and challis. At a rate of 7500 
government sponsored units per year, it would take over 50 years to address the problem 
for today’s slum population alone.  
 
7. Even this ambitious performance would not provide for the additional households who 
cannot afford formal homes. Over the last ten years, on average 5,600 new households 
per annum, or 90 percent of our estimate of government capacity to provide new 
affordable housing directly, are added to the existing population in slums.  
 
 
8. These simple calculations –which abstract from many of the difficulties of using public 
housing as a path to slum free cities---nonetheless illustrate an important point. The 
magnitude of the problem is such that public production of housing and reservations will 
not solve the problem. No matter how important public housing initiatives and 
affordable housing reservations may be—they cannot alone ensure that all of 
Ahmedabad’s families can live in a decent dignified home in a foreseeable future.   
 
9. Our assessment of changes in land use patterns and the physical patterns of supply 
of new homes suggest that government practices and policies are making housing 
more costly and out of reach of a large share of the population. This is happening 
quite independently of government programs to build public housing and enhance 
reservation policies.  
 
10. Government can do much more for housing affordability by re-examining its role in real 
estate markets, and making it easier and less costly to provide formal homes all over the 
AMC.  
 
11. Positive Developments: How has government facilitated flexible and responsive housing 
supply? 
a. The DP approved in 2002 increased the land available for urban development by 
sizeable 43 percent. A total of 127sq km of new land was zoned for urban 
development.  
b. Thanks to streamlined procedures subsequent to the earthquake in 2001, TP 
schemes have provided basic infrastructure and services in these new areas.  
c. These conditions give Ahmedabad an advantage over many other cities where 
such infrastructure is not yet built, and urban expansion is therefore costly and 
disorganized. 
d. Reservations and zoning limitations have been reduced, creating more flexibility 
in land use. 
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e. The repeal of the Urban Land Ceilings Act has stopped the process of notification 
which freezes lands for development, leaving them in legal limbo and 
undeveloped. 
 
12.  Remaining Agenda:  
a. Our assessment shows many symptoms of a very tight land market. Development 
of the city over the last ten years shows developers moving out further into the 
periphery and economizing on land as they do. Built up densities even in the 
newly developed suburban areas are very high—higher than densities in the 
central business district of Ahmedabad (CBD). Formal developments are 
fragmented on the periphery—suggesting difficulties in obtaining plots for 
development.  Overall density of built- up space in Ahmedabad is rising. 
Normally, as incomes rise, densities in formally developed areas go down, 
reflecting a taste for larger homes and more open space as incomes grow. 
Ahmedabad is going in the opposition direction.. In aggregate, households are 
economizing on land, even more than they did ten years ago when their incomes 
were lower.  
b. Government policies forces households and developers to use more land than 
needed to provide legal formal and well located housing.  
 
13.  Areas for policy change. A number of policy changes could reduce the restrictions in the 
current supply system and allow all producers in the market to provide more and better 
affordable homes.  Since these policies all interact in the decisions on where and how to 
build homes and the price the market will bear to purchase them, it is not wise to focus on 
the one or the other stroke of the pen reform to improve outcomes. Housing supply is a 
system, and the government is involved in nearly all the important points in the system, 
from infrastructure provision to property rights enforcement to building by-laws. 
Reducing one constraint may simply shift the pressures in the market elsewhere. We 
provide the following list of areas for attention and if necessary, incremental change. 
Even if reforms are incremental, they should affect housing providers across the board to 
make the system more open and competitive. Selecting a preferred reform among any in 
the list below, for selective exemptions to specific developers, will not result in a 
responsive affordable supply system for a dynamic economy. The list of areas for reform 
below should be read with this important context in mind.   
 
14. Maximum Floor Space Index (FSI) remains uniform and low at 1.8 throughout the AMC. 
The central business district in West Ahmedabad, one of the most desirable areas of the 
city, has among the lowest densities in the city—meaning that only the privileged few 
can afford to be in this desirable area. With such low FSI’s, redevelopment to respond to 
new demands is either not possible or not economical.  As a result, new development is 
forced into the periphery, as has happened for example along Ashram Road extending to 
the suburbs.  
 
15. Redevelopment or major improvements of already developed areas in the city—even if 
allowable under the maximum FSI limits—is very risky and difficult because of 
ambiguity in land tenure and property rights. It can take years and considerable sums to 
settle any title problems that arise in a redevelopment project and the risks of legal 
challenge after a major redevelopment are considerable. So, the costs of expanding 
housing in well located areas through intensified redevelopment are very substantial. This 
too forces new development into the periphery on newly developed land.  
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16. But Expansion at the Urban Periphery is Still Difficult, Costly and Uncertain 
a. Of the land newly zoned for urban development in the AMC, since 2002, only 
about 20 percent actually has been developed, in spite of rapidly rising prices. 
b. While many TP schemes have been started since the new DP was in place, none 
of them has completed the process of converting all lots from rural to urban 
designation and approving new ownership boundaries. Unlike zoning for urban 
use, this process takes place plot by plot and is slow and unpredictable. It takes 
good knowledge of a complex system and ability to fund the project over the long 
period of uncertainty while obtaining approvals to undertake a significant formal 
development. This helps established developers and excludes large many small 
housing producers and thus makes the developer sector less competitive.  
c. The reforms of the TP scheme process after the earthquake in 2001 have made it 
possible to build infrastructure before settling tenure and rural urban conversion 
problems.  However,   the infrastructure benefits are blunted by the regulatory 
uncertainties surrounding many of the serviced plots. The fragmented, but high 
density development at the urban periphery observed in our assessment is an 
indicator that arduous and slow plot by plot clearances are preventing full use of 
the infrastructure. 
 
17. All the above factors make land difficult and costly to get. As a result, prices of land rise, 
and land becomes the most important factor in the cost of a home. Well located land is 
particularly scarce and particularly costly. This penalizes the lower income groups, who 
can ill afford either the cost of transport or the time for lengthy commutes. 
 
18. Government further aggravates the problem with the General Development Control 
Regulations. These regulations, running to many pages, fix a number of land use and 
design parameters that make formal housing voracious consumers of land—the most 
expensive input to a home. 
 
19. Setbacks, plot coverage limitations, requirements for parking and elevators impose upper 
middle class tastes on new formal development. These standards are set throughout the 
city, allowing no variation by neighborhood.  
 
20. These regulations have made it impossible to continue to build ‘vernacular’ traditional 
developments that now make up a large share of the housing stock in Ahmedabad. These 
developments are pleasant, affordable, and use land more effectively than the standard 
apartment building developments that are the lowest cost formal options in Ahmedabad. 
Vernacular neighborhoods economize on land and privacy to emphasize more living 
space, but these options are not legal and could not get formal approval. Regularizing 
tenure in such developments would also be costly and risky, since an early step in the 
process is demolition of any substandard buildings.  
 
21. Allowing more flexibility in the multiple requirements in the GDCR would offer options 
for supply of lower cost formal housing, which is still safe, decent, and acceptable to 
cultural norms and practices. Selective application of different standards in different 
neighborhoods could open up more options for affordable formal housing. Scope to allow 
grandfathering of housing that is safe and clean but not up to GDCR standards would 
facilitate regularizing tenure and increase the supply of legal housing that can be 
mortgaged and improved using formal finance channels. 
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22. Ahmedabad  needs  more 
 
a. More in situ neighborhood upgradation in poor neighborhoods 
b. More investments in bulk supply and infrastructure networks to accommodate 
rising demands for infrastructure with rising incomes and improved slums 
c. More flexibility in standards for formal housing 
d. More differentiated FSI to meet demands for well-located space 
e. More expeditious pathways to resolution of property rights disputes 
f. More predictability and speed in rural urban land conversion that will lead to a 
more competitive and open entry for supplying housing. 
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Annex 1. Computation of Distribution of Household Income in AMC 
The principle source of household data for computing distribution of income by household is the 
National Sample Survey (NSS) data. The NSS rounds provide survey data on expenditure by 
household. The data is compiled by district, then divided into rural and urban samples. Therefore 
the closest approximation of the area of our study within the NSS framework is the Ahmedabad 
urban  district, of which the AMC population is over 80% of total population. The NSS rounds of 
measuring household expenditure are available for 1999/2000, 2004/05 and most recently 
2009/2010, which was released as this study was being prepared. It is generally recognized that 
the 1999/2000 round is not comparable with the more recent rounds so we did not use it for 
estimating household expenditure distribution for the start year of our study of 2001. Instead, we 
took the expenditure data from 2004/05 and rebased it to 2001 using the growth rate of nominal 
per capita income in Gujarat State between 2000/01 and 2004/05 as published by the Central 
Statistical Organization. Unfortunately, income growth for the AMC or Ahmedabad Urban 
Agglomeration is not published in Gujarat, unlike in some other states. Income growth in 
Ahmedabad could well have been higher over this period, since urban areas tend to grow more 
rapidly than rural areas. On the other hand, Gujarat has experienced exceptionally rapid 
agricultural growth over the last ten years, so the difference in Gujarat may not be as pronounced 
as it might be in other states. The correction factor applied for this purpose is 0.71. To estimate 
income distribution in 2011, we used data from  the sample survey of the NSS 2009/10 round. 
This was then adjusted to 2011 by multiplying by the increase in net per capita income for the 
state of Gujarat between 2009/10 and 2010/11, which reflected growth of 14% in nominal terms. 
Since we measure affordability in relation to nominal housing prices, it is important to estimate 
the income distribution in nominal terms as well. As can be seen in Annex 2, prices of housing 
appear to be rising more rapidly than incomes for the state as a whole.  
 
To test the slight difference in coverage between the AMC and the Ahmedabad urban area, we 
generated an expenditure distribution for the AMC area  using the poverty mapping methodology 
prepared for the Planning Commission by the India Development Foundation based on mapping 
the 2001 census data and the 2004/05 NSS expenditure survey data33. To do this, we included 
those census areas that were outside the AMC in 2001 to obtain census data for 2001 covering 
the same geographical area as the current AMC.  This methodology also permits us to increase 
the sample size considerably and hence improve the reliability of the estimates. This was 
compared to the expenditure distribution for the same area in 2004/05 using the NSS data.   The 
difference between the NSS median expenditure for 2004/05 and the AMC estimates for 2004/05 
using the poverty mapping methodology is 2.8%, which gives us confidence that we have a 
reasonably reliable estimate of the NSS expenditure distribution as of 2004/05. Using the NSS 
data for both 2004/05 and 2009/10, we were able to estimate two different expenditure 
distributions at two points in time and capture recent developments in the income distribution. 
                                                 
33 See Hentschel, Jesko, Jean Olson Lanjouw, Peter Lanjouw, Javier Poggi. (1998). “Combining Census and Survey Data to 
Study Spatial Dimensions of Poverty and Inequality.”The World Bank Economic Review for a description of this 
method.  We are most grateful to the IDF and Ms. Purti Sharma of the IDF. She  applied their poverty mapping 
model  to the  AMC area for this purpose.  
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Once the 2011 census data are available, in principle it would be possible to apply the poverty 
mapping methodology for refining the expenditure distribution. 
For examining housing affordability, most rules of thumb are based on income, not expenditure. 
However, estimates of income distribution by detailed income classes are not prepared in India. 
To convert expenditure to income, we assumed that the savings rate across income classes was 
65 percent which is close to average propensity to consume out of household disposable income 
in the national income accounts in recent years. Lower income groups, which are of most interest 
to us, may save at lower rates, so to the extent that this is true, these estimates of income may be 
on the high side. We also corrected for the well documented difference between household 
consumption as estimated in the national income accounts by increasing consumption 
expenditure by 30%.  For those who feel that this adjustment is not warranted, then our estimates 
of income are biased upward by the same factor for the two periods under study. As such, 
estimates of affordability of residential real estate based on these income distribution figures may 
be somewhat biased upward by our choice of adjustments. However, this may compensate to 
some extent for the perceived bias of NSS data toward lower income groups. Our results are 
striking in that—even with such generous estimates of income growth –a  large share of the 
population, 50 percent, would have difficulty affording a new  well located formal home. If one 
were to adjust income estimates downward, this implies an even larger share of the population 
would find new formal housing unaffordable. 
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Annex 2: Ahmedabad: Residential Prices 
1. Sources of data 
There are two potential sources of data. The first one is RESIDEX compiled by NHB. However 
this is an index does not give prices in absolute numbers. The other source is Accommodation 
Times a journal that has been tracking real estate prices for a long. There might be other local 
sources but they are not in public domain and not easily accessible. 
2. NHB RESIDEX 
The RESIDEX data available for Ahmedabad is given in Table below. It covers 2007 as the base 
year (100) and then quarterly indices for five zones of Ahmedabad from 2010 to 2011. 
 
Ahmed
abad 
  2007 
Index 
Jan-
Mar 
2010 
Index 
Apr-
Jun 
2010 
Index 
Jul-Sep 
2010 
Index 
Oct-
Dec 
2010 
Index 
Jan-
Mar 
2011 
Index 
Apr-
June 
2011 
Index 
Zones                 
Centra
l Zone 
Bhadra, Dudheswar, Gaikwad 
Haveli, Girdhar Nagar, 
Wadigam 
100 142 191 188 189 194 213 
East 
Zone 
Gomtipur Gam; Old 
Viratnagar; Vastral; Zulta 
Minara 
100 87 121 120 147 146 149 
West 
Zone 
Bodakdev; Ambli Bopal; 
Jodhpur; Solagam; Thaltej 
Shilaj Road; Vastrapur; 
Vejalpur; Sola Road; 
Ambawadi; Chandkheda Gam 
100 139 122 131 202 213 183 
North 
Zone 
Buddh Nagar; Saijpur-Bogha; 
Sardar Nagar; Vishnu Nagar 
100 150 137 179 182 196 167 
South 
Zone 
Abad Dairy; Bhaduat Nagar; 
Gordhan Vadi; Ramvadi; 
Vatva Gam; Vishal Nagar 
100 85 116 130 130 113 157 
City 
Index   100 113 131 141 164 165 169 
  
These indices are graphically shown below. 
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3. Accommodation Times 
Accommodation Times provides prices in absolute numbers for 2009 and 2010. These are shown 
below. 
Ahemdabad    Rs. / Sq.Ft. 
    NEW PROJ. 
Residex 
Zone LOCATION RESIDENTIAL COMMERCIAL 
    2009 2010 2009 2010 
West Ellisbridge 1200-2400 2200-4600 1200-2400 4000-12000 
West Ashram road 1950-2350 4000-5000 3200-4800 3200-6800 
West C.G.Road) 1250-1950 3000-6000 2400-8200 2400-8200 
West Navrangpura 950-1400 2000-2400 1950-3500 1950-3500 
West Naranpura 500-1200 1200-295 1950-2300 1950-2300 
West Vastrapur 600-950 1200-295 1750-295 1750-295 
West Satellite Road 880-1600 4000-6000 2950-3200 2950-7200 
West Ambawadi 500-195 2000-2400 950-1500 950-1500 
West Drive-in-road 800-1200 2000-2400 1500-295 1500-295 
West Paldi 500-950 2000-2400 1500-195 1500-195 
West New C G Road 500-950 3000-4000 500-1200 500-1200 
 
However all the zones in this zone are in larger west zone used in RESIDEX. Thus the coverage 
of Accommodation Times is not adequate to get city-wide data particularly of outer zones of 
AMC. 
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Annex 3. Ahmedabad: Cost of Slum and Chawl Upgrading 
1. Introduction 
The intention of the upgrading program is to cover all slums and challis with the provision of 
basic environmental infrastructure – water supply, sanitation, storm water drainage, streets and 
streetlights and solid waste collection. Estimates of cost of upgrading in terms of ‘order of 
magnitude’ are necessary for designing the program and establishing its feasibility. This is what 
is attempted for this paper. 
 
2. Sample Slum: Ramapir No Tekro  
A representative slum called Ramapir No Tekro located in the West Zone in Vadaj Ward having 
an area of 36.29 ha. and total number of 7,269 households is selected for estimating the cost of 
upgrading. Map 1 shows the aerial image of the slum. There are some elements of the following 
environmental infrastructure currently available; 
• Streets 
• Water Supply 
• Sewerage 
• Storm water Drainage 
• Solid waste management 
• Streetlights 
However as the status of existing infrastructure is not known, the costs have been estimated 
without taking into account the utility of the existing assets. The estimates thus represent the 
outer limits of cost at 2011 prices. 
 
3. Standard of Services  
Since most slums are part of the larger network of trunk or primary infrastructure, the standards 
of delivery of services depend upon the availability and the capacity of such primary 
infrastructure. In the present exercise on-site infrastructure costs have been estimated for the 
desired standard of service without explicitly evaluating the availability and capacity of off-site 
infrastructure. The targeted standards and likely variations in off-site availability are presented in 
Table 1. 
Map 1 
Ramapir No Tekro, West Zone, 
Ahmedabad. 
(Source: Google Earth) 
Ramapir No 
Tekro 
132 ft Ring Road 
Sabarmati 
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Table 1: Standards of Service Delivery 
On-site Standard Likely variations 
Water supply  
Quantity: 140 lpcd (as individual WC with water borne 
sewerage is intended). Off-site municipal main not available. 
Separate rising main required from the pumping station. 
Where municipal mains of 
adequate capacity are available 
nearby, cost savings may occur. 
Toilets and Sewerage  
Water Closet for every household Physical constraint of hut size may 
dilute this intent and WC shared by 
2 or 3 households may have to be 
accepted. 
On site collection system linked to the municipal sewer. Depending upon the invert levels 
this may require pumping or in 
case of non-availability of 
municipal sewer, local treatment 
and disposal (e.g. Septic Tank & 
Soak Pit) may have to be provided 
as a short term solution.  
Roads and Storm Water Drainage  
Roads wider than 6m are designed for light vehicular traffic 
e.g. auto-rikshaws and garbage tempo and occasional 
ambulance and fire engine. Streets narrower than 6 m are 
essentially designed for auto-rikshaws, two wheelers and 
pedestrians. No widening is proposed. 
In some cases where existing 
streets are extremely narrow and 
long, some widening may be 
desirable. In that case sacrificing 
some front space like verandahs or  
resettlement of a few households 
within the slum may become  
necessary. Such changes are 
minimized when decided by the 
community 
Storm water drainage designed for the maximum rainfall 
intensity of 25 mm per hour is considered adequate for 
Ahmedabad. The entire surface of narrow streets with 
suitable slopes is used for draining rainwater. Along wider 
streets piped drains with catch pits and inspection chambers 
are provided. 
Invert levels of off-site municipal 
storm drains may impact the 
designs and costs.  
Where space is available rainwater 
harvesting to recharge ground 
water could also be considered. 
Solid waste management  
AMC currently provides door-to-door collection service for 
solid waste within slums. Cost of vehicles for such a service 
is not included. But a collection point from where a dumper 
placer could pick up the collected solid waste is provided.  
At certain places, the space for the 
dumper may not be available. 
 
4. Estimates of per Household Costs  
The standards mentioned in Table 1 were translated into engineering designs, materials and 
specification to arrive ant quantities and based on current market rates into estimates of costs. 
These are presented as per household costs and likely variations in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Per Household cost of upgrading 
Infrastructure Cost per Household Likely variation 
Water supply  6522 Cost may increase to Rs. 10302 if 
Elevated Reservoir and / or 
Underground Tank is needed for 
local storage 
Sewerage 6462 Cost may increase to Rs. 8455 if 
pumping is involved andto Rs. 
17250 if local treatment by way of 
septic tank and soak pit is required. 
Roads 5393  
Storm Water Drainage 322  
Streetlights 1218  
Solid waste removal 380  
WCaccommodated within 
the existing structure 
5861 If entirely new structure is required 
cost may increase to Rs.20492 
Community Hall 108  
Total 26265 Maximum cost would be Rs. 57985 
15% mark up for difficult 
conditions of work in slums  
30000 67000 
 
 
The details of engineering designs and estimates of costs are given in Annex 1. 
Thus the average cost of upgrading (only civil cost) comes to Rs. 47,000 Approx. Cost of other 
program elements like management costs, survey, design etc is outlined below.  
Table 3 
Per Household Cost   2011-12 
Management Structure 
 
 90  
Project Preparation % of Civil Cost 1  470  
Project management % of Civil Cost 2.5  1,175  
Survey, Household Data 
 
 7,200  
Community Consultation & Design 
  Civil Works 
 
 47,000  
TOTAL      55,935  
  
Approx.   56,000  
    Thus, the total per household cost of the Upgradation Program would be approx. Rs. 56,000. 
 
5. Civil Cost of the Upgrading Program  
Assuming that the total number of households to be covered under the upgrading program is 
400,000; the total civil cost of the upgradation program may vary between Rs. 1,266 crores and 
Rs. 2,827 crores.  
 
6. Augmentation of City-Wide Networks 
The above costs are essentially on-site local costs. The assumption that every household will 
have an individual water connection and an individual WC might substantially increase the 
demand for such services as compared to the present levels of delivery.The trunk or primary 
infrastructure network may not have the capacity to cope with the demand for services at the 
assumed standards. It would therefore be useful to assess the network capacities and plan for 
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their augmentation concomitant with the slum-upgrading program. However quantification of 
cost of network augmentation has not been attempted here. 
 
The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation in its budget for 2011-12 has already identified and 
allocated funds for a number of initiatives aimed at augmenting citywide infrastructure for water 
and sewerage. They are: 
a. 24 hr water supply service (Pg 11)– Rs. 2 Crores 
Though the overall quantity of water supply is sufficient to provide 140 lpcd,  certain 
areas of the city are not receiving adequate supply. A pilot project shall be undertaken to 
plan and implement 24 hr water supply service within Ahmedabad. This has been 
implemented in other cities to good effect and could help Ahmedabad manage its water 
supply better. 
 
b. Online water quality maintenance System (Pg 12) – Rs. 1.75 Crores 
In order to have better monitoring of water quality at the three water treatment plants in 
the city (Kotarpur, Jaspur and Raska), an online quality maintenance system has been 
approved for implementation . 
  
c. Drainage Pumping Station (Pg 12)– Rs. 4 Crores  
One new drainage pumping station for the newly incorporated areas in order to improve 
drainage system near Chandkheda has been included in the budget. 
 
d. 22 new Borewells (Pg 12)– Rs. 5Crores 
Addition of borewells to 22 existing distribution stations in various areas within the city 
has been included to ensure that in case of emergency situation when surface water is 
difficult to procure, water can be provided to the citizens. 
 
e. New overhead tanks (Pg13)– Rs. 30 Crores 
Provision of new tanks for overhead storage of water in 8 wards and increasing capacity 
of  existing tank in 1 ward has been included in the budget for the purposeof providing 
water at adequate pressure to residents. 
 
f. Providing services to communities built by Gujarat Housing Board and Slum Clearance 
Board (Pg 13) – Rs. 10 Crores 
To improve quality of services such as water, drainage, streets, footpath, garden, 
streetlights etc, in communities built by GHB and SCB, AMC has allocated Rs. 10 crores 
in the current budget. 
 
g. Gamtal Service (Pg14)– Rs. 20 Crores 
The gamtals newly incorporated within AMC limits (in 2006) shall be provided better 
services and infrastructure and community facilities in order to better integrated them 
with the urban area. This will also help improve the gamtal areas and make them more 
desirable places to live in. 
 
Based on the above, it can be seen that AMC is already undertaking initiatives to improve trunk 
infrastructure  and access to the services. These initiatives could be suitably expanded to meet 
increase in demand due to upgrading of slums and chawls. 
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7. Cost of the Program 
The cost of the program has been worked out based on the following key assumptions 
 
1. Total number of household to be upgraded - 400,000 
2. Per Household cost of upgrading at 2011 prices – Rs. 56000 
3. Project preparation and project management cost – 1% and 2.5% of civil work cost 
respectively 
4. Rate of inflation 9% p.a. for the next five years. 
 
Based on these assumptions, Tables 4 and 5 give cost of the program for a five-year and three-
year implementation plan respectively. 
 
Table 4: Program Cost for Five-Year Implementation 
Data
Households to be upgraded 400000
Key Assumptions
Option= 1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
1 - 5 Year 10 15 25 25 25
2- 3 Year 25 40 35
Inflation % p.a. 9 9 9 9 9
Summary of Cost of SUP Program Rs. in Crores
Item Initiation Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total
Households upgraded 40,000 60,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 400,000
Management Structure 0.05 0.78 0.86 0.93 1.02 1.11 4.75
Project Preparation % of Civil Cost 1 2.05 3.35 6.09 6.63 7.23 25.35
Project management % of Civil Co 2.5 5.12 8.38 15.22 16.59 18.08 63.38
31.39 51.33 93.24 101.63 110.78 388.37
0.00
Civil Works 204.92 335.04 608.66 663.44 723.15 2535.22
Total 2.10 245.57 401.69 724.69 789.91 853.12 3017.08
Survey, Household Data, 
Community Consultation & Design
 
Table 5: Program Cost for Three-Year Implementation 
Data
Households to be upgraded 400000
Key Assumptions
Option= 2 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
1 - 5 Year 10 15 25 25 25
2- 3 Year 25 40 35
Inflation % p.a. 9 9 9 9 9
Summary of Cost of SUP Program Rs. in Crores
Item Initiation Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total
Households upgraded 100,000 160,000 140,000 0 0 400,000
Management Structure 0.05 0.78 0.86 0.93 0.00 0.00 2.62
Project Preparation % of Civil Cost 1 5.12 8.93 8.52 0.00 0.00 22.58
Project management % of Civil Co 2.5 12.81 22.34 21.30 0.00 0.00 56.45
78.48 136.87 130.54 0.00 0.00 345.89
0.00
Civil Works 512.30 893.45 852.13 0.00 0.00 2257.88
Total 5.17 613.31 1062.03 1004.90 0.00 0.00 2685.42
Survey, Household Data, 
Community Consultation & Design
 
 
 
It would be seen from these tables that the five-year program needs additional expenditure due 
largely to the high rate of inflation. On the other hand three-year program requires a big start-up 
with little scope for ‘learning by doing’ requiring concerted and committed efforts. 
 
8. Impact on Local Budget 
The Average Municipal Budget of Ahmedabad for Capital Expenditures has been around Rs. 
1300 crores in the last 3 years (2008-2011).  This indicates their current capacity to undertake 
large infrastructure improvement projects. 34 
                                                 
34 *This does not include capital expenditure towards the Sabarmati Riverfront Development Project, since it is set 
up as an SPV and is funded through a loan from HUDCO. However, the AMC budget does include expenses for 
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For a 5 year program (as mentioned above) AMC would need to increase this budget by approx. 
220 crores in the first year which is 17% of the average capital budget. This allows AMC to 
build capacity gradually. A 3 year program would involve an additional allocation of 550 crores 
(42% of the average capital budget) in the first year itself. This may be a challenge for the 
municipal corporation since it may not allow enough time to build capacity in order to undertake 
such a large project.  
 
Table-6: AMC Budget from 2008 - 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
                                                                                                                                                             
BRTS project related infrastructure improvements and bus procurements. The BRTS is operated by Ahmedabad 
Janmarg Limited which is also an SPV 
                all figures in Rupees Thousands
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
FINAL FINAL REVISED APPROVED BY AMC
Total Capital Income 8,762,959                                            10,365,515                          17,762,152                               28,607,000 
Total Capital Expenditure                   10,311,889                          12,950,453                          17,762,152                               28,607,000 
Total Revenue  Income             15,541,668.00                    16,169,373.00                    22,353,514.00                               31,975,350 
Total Revenue  Expenditure               9,104,426.00 11,559,960.00                                           13,494,597                               17,903,008 
Total INCOME(CAPITAL+REVENUE)                   24,304,627                          26,534,888                          40,115,666                               60,582,350 
Total EXPENDITURE(CAPITAL+REVENUE) 19,416,315                24,510,413                        31,256,749                        46,510,008                             
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ATTACHMENT: Tables for 5-year and 3-year program 
 
FIVE YEAR PROGRAM 
 
Table A1 
 
 
Table A2 
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Table A3 
 
Table A4 
 
THREE YEAR PROGRAM 
Table B1 
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Table B2 
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Table B3 
 
Table B4 
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Annex 4: Evolution of City Spatial Structure between 2001 and 2011 
 
The various regulatory constraints described above were tested for their impact on the poor. 
However, land use regulations like maximum FSI and maximum land coverage have also 
unforeseen side effects on the structure of cities. We will now consider the effects of current 
regulations like maximum FSI but also of TP schemes administrative constraints on the spatial 
structure of Ahmedabad. The viability of the dominant mode of transport – transit or individual 
means of transport (motorcycle or private cars) depends largely on the nature of urban spatial 
structures. The mobility of workers and consumers depends largely on the efficiency of urban 
transport, which in turn depends on the spatial structure of cities which are often irreversible in 
the short and medium term. We will then study the pattern of spatial development of Ahmedabad 
metropolitan region and try to anticipate structural problems that could be corrected become they 
become irreversible. 
Figure 1: Map of new land development by district 
 
Forty two percent of the land developed in Ahmedabad between 2001 and 2011 has been located 
within the “new West Zone” corresponding to the 2004 territorial addition to the AMC 
boundaries. The map and table of Figure 1 shows the pattern of developed land increase in the 
AMC. It is important to note that this map and data concern only the land developed it does not 
necessarily correspond to the increase in population, which often has occurred through 
densification of areas already developed before 2001.  
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The table of Figure 2 shows the change in land use between the various zones shown on the map 
of Figure 1. We can see that the bulk of the increase of the land occupied by slums has been 
relatively even geographically. Practically no growth occurred in the cantonment area, although 
it is one of the lowest developed area of the city while being the best located in term of 
infrastructure and access to the city center. 
Figure 2: Differences in land use between 2001 and 2011 
  
The spatial distribution of densities in a city has an important impact on labor mobility and 
transport efficiency. The map of Figure 3 shows the distribution of population densities in built-
up areas per ward.  The distribution of densities present 2 anomalies: 1) the high densities areas 
are nearly exclusively to the East of the Sabarmati river and 2) the high density areas expand at 
more than 14 km from the center on the East side while the areas within 5 km from the CBD on 
the West side have relatively low densities.  The east side has a lot of industrial and informal 
employment but most of the modern sector is expanding on the West side. This spatial pattern of 
densities reflects of course a form of income segregation between East and West.  The effect of 
on the efficiency of transport might be large in the future, as a mass of workers and consumers 
would want to commute  from East to West across the few bridges on the Sabarmati River.  
Unfortunately we could not have access to the ward level population from the 2011 census to 
know if the trend shown in 2001 had continued or reversed in 2011.    
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Figure 3: Ahmedabad population densities in 2001 
 
The profile of population density in 2001 shows the traditional decrease in density from the 
center to the periphery although the profile would be very different if one was drawing a separate 
profile for the west bank and east bank of the Sabarmati river. The average built-up density in 
2001 was 244 people/hectare and reached 262 p/ha in 2011. This increase in density with time is 
exceptional for large cities. In itself it may not be a cause of concern if the density pattern was 
more homogeneous between the 2 banks of the river.  
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Figure 4: profile of population densities in 2001 
 
The comparison between the profile of densities between 1991 and 2001 shows the large 
structural changes that have occurred between these dates. There has been a large increase in the 
density close to the center. Mostly this densification has occurred in the old city, which densely 
built but not densely inhabited in 1991. The densification of the periphery has also been 
spectacular. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Profile of population densities in 1991 and 2001 
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Annex 5. Summary of Lessons from the  Local City-Wide Assessment of Ahmedabad For 
Developing Strategies For ‘Slum Free Cities’ 
 
 
Any slum free city strategy should have two distinct parts.  
 
The first step is to implement an immediate investment program to improve living 
conditions for all—with first priority given to in situ improvement of slums/challis and any 
other areas without basic services, coupled with supporting investments in the 
infrastructure network. Our study shows this approach is affordable, cost effective and can 
be implemented at scale if designed simply and pragmatically. Other solutions for 
affordable housing, such as in situ rehabilitation, government constructed housing, and 
reservations for low-cost housing are appealing to various constituencies for various 
reasons—but are necessarily limited in impact and scope. They are undersized in relation 
to the size of the problem in Indian cities. 
 
The second essential step is to understand the underlying real estate market dynamics and 
the government’s role in driving up the cost of housing for all income groups. This initial 
assessment should be used to plan longer term steps, usually a combination of institutional 
and regulatory reforms plus investments, to reduce the pressure on land markets, facilitate 
individual and small developer entry in supplying legal, formal housing,  and thereby 
create conditions for private market supply of affordable housing to complement 
government investments in this area.  
 
I. Assessing Investment Requirements 
 
1) It is important to identify all underserviced areas rather than merely looking at ‘slums’. In 
India and other countries, slums may be subject to an administrative definition under the 
relevant legislation and in this context, slums may be interpreted to mean only those 
notified slums. Yet notified slums do not necessarily cover all substandard underserviced 
neighborhoods in need of improvement, including recently established squatter 
settlements for example35. 
                                                 
35 35Legal definitions typically make no reference to formality of land tenure in slums.  
For example Gujarat Slum Areas Act 1976 slums as :  
Annex  5 
Page 2 
 
 
  
In some cities, there exist other types of informal areas which may not receive formal 
infrastructure services and therefore may suffer from substandard living conditions due to 
lack of basic services. In the case of Ahmedabad, many of the challis, which were 
originally developed by mill owners as low-cost worker housing are not serviced with  in 
house water and toilets for example. These challis may also include new informal 
settlements that have filled in open areas in the original challi development, so they are 
hybrids. In Ahmedabad, challis cover a very substantial area, comparable to that covered 
by slums.  Leaving them out would ignore substantial underserviced areas. 
 
Gamtals are urban villages, ie village areas that have been surrounded by the city. They 
are considered legal developments and are formal in this sense, but many also lack basic 
infrastructure network services, and should be considered for improved services if cities 
are to be considered ‘slum free’.  
 
Finally, sidewalk dwellers and transit housing for workers house substantial numbers of 
households and services in these areas can be very poor. Solutions for these areas will not 
be the same as for established neighborhoods, since the population tends to be more 
transient. However such areas deserve further analysis and assistance as cities seek to 
improve living conditions for all.  
 
Costings were prepared on the basis of market rates, not using government standard rates 
which tend to lag the market developments. The standard schedule of rates approach 
creates predictable problems for implementation and quality of works. In buoyant 
economies like Ahmedabad’s such problems are likely to be acute. The difference 
between the two estimates was substantial.  
 
2) Our consultations with civil society indicate that it is very important to examine the needs 
for upgrades of network infrastructure that services all neighborhoods and include these 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
However in practice only squatter settlements with informal tenure are treated as slums. 
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needs for infrastructure upgradation in investment programs whose goal is providing 
universal access to basic services. A number of slums lack access to network 
infrastructure, particularly sewers. This diminishes the sanitation benefits of in house 
toilet facilities, and raises the costs of providing in house sanitation solutions. Other 
slums that have received in house water connections have experienced problems with 
declining water pressure as a result of expanding water connections and increased water 
usage. One can expect that this may also occur in surrounding neighborhoods. Such 
neighborhood shortages could lead to backlash against extending services to all 
households, undermine support for in situ upgradation, and increase pressures for 
relocation of slum dwellers.  
 
Our estimates of the impact of providing basic in situ upgrading city-wide in Ahmedabad 
(based on  analysis of trends in capital spending in the city) show that a five year 
improvement program is quite affordable for the city. An expansion of network 
infrastructure of an amount equal to the slum upgrading could be accommodated in the 
case of Ahmedabad. However, this may not be the case in all cities. This budgetary 
analysis should be performed to ensure that basic service provision through better 
connections to networks does not lead to shortages of water and sanitation services. 
 
3) Our identification of locations of slums showed that a relatively large number of 
households were vulnerable to flooding due to location near a few large lakes. These 
slums are hence being considered for relocation. Such relocations could be much reduced 
through investments in flood protection at a lower financial and social cost than 
relocating these households into new housing.  
 
4) We successfully tested the use of satellite imagery combined with selective ground 
truthing with the help of local NGOs for a comprehensive spatial identification of slum 
areas. This can be done through identification of typical physical characteristics of 
informal areas from the air, and then can be supplemented with local detailed population 
and household surveys typically available for a sample of slums. This quick assessment 
provides a broad gauged estimate of the total underserviced areas and population, and it 
takes considerably less time and energy than the detailed comprehensive household 
surveys that are typically requested of cities wishing to apply for support for slum 
improvement programs. Such a quick assessment can be used to assess broad feasibility 
at the city level and therefore avoid a long period of comprehensive surveying which may 
considerably delay the start of useful work by seeking unnecessary precision.  
 
5) Satellite imagery can also be used to validate ground level surveys quickly. This helps to 
avoid errors that may creep in when surveying firms without specific knowledge of slums 
are asked to assess densely packed and crowded areas in a short period of time.   
 
6) Ultimately this satellite imagery can then be used to guide detailed station surveys 
undertaken in with participation and validation by the communities themselves as 
specific investment plans are elaborated.  These approaches have been tested in 
Ahmedabad and other cities in India. Detailed plans for slum pockets can be prepared 
individually and sequentially with much more accuracy than one survey which attempts 
to assess the magnitude of all requirements at one time. The fluid nature of slum 
communities is such that errors may be introduced and very poor quality data generated 
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when a once off comprehensive assessment is required. The notion that a precise once for 
all measure of slums is necessary and feasible can then create its own problems. As any 
attempted survey of this kind gets out of date, it becomes difficult to revise the ‘official’ 
estimate and respond accordingly.    
 
II. Making Implementation of City-Wide Improvements Faster and More Effective 
 
 
.     1)  Requiring that in situ upgrading be accompanied by provision of security of tenure, even 
limited as it was in the case of Ahmedabad, to a ten year no eviction guarantee, is an 
obstacle to the goal of providing universal access to basic services in poor 
neighborhoods. It makes the process harder and slower and beneficiaries do not always 
demand it. They have accepted to pay for service improvements even when they must 
sign an agreement stating that they may be evicted. The point is to be clear that services 
cannot be provided in their neighborhoods if formal tenure security is a condition.  
 
In the Government of India (GOI) program for slum free cities, RAY, the government is 
asking    all States to provide tenure to slum dwellers. This is seen as very impractical for 
a number of reasons to be discussed below. On the other hand, central public lands, 
where many slums are located all over India, cannot be upgraded, because the central 
agencies that own them refuse to allow any improvements to be made in these slums. 
GOI could be very helpful in negotiating with these agencies to adopt an approach similar 
to that used in Ahmedabad’s slums. They should give their no objection to providing 
basic services for the health and safety of the population--even if they cannot provide 
tenure security. This could speed the path to improving living conditions in many of slum 
areas where now, not even public toilets can be installed due to objections of the central 
agencies in charge of these lands.  
 
2)   Providing tenure security makes it very complicated to provide services on privately 
owned lands, since private landowners are very likely to resist such a formal curtailment 
of their de jure property rights. Such tenure guarantees also make it more complicated 
even to provide services on public lands since all public landowners may not be able or 
wish to agree to such guarantees, as discussed above.  
 
3)   In Ahmedabad, problems were encountered once the ‘no eviction’ guarantee could not 
be honored in certain upgraded areas that got in the way of planned infrastructure 
improvements. This controversy tarnished the reputation of the entire program and 
eroded support for continuing the slum networking program (SNP). This is the case even 
though stakeholders we consulted believe that the SNP is the best way to improve living 
conditions quickly and effectively in challis and slums.  
 
4)   Providing tenure security also led to a number of other complexities that slowed down 
implementation. It added many layers of approvals and non-objections from city 
departments which did not add to the quality of project works, but which slowed 
implementation time. It also required individual beneficiaries to produce considerable 
paperwork for which is hard for the typical slum dweller to obtain. Thus the tenure 
security requirement slowed down project implementation. It ultimately did not protect 
households when the city needed the land on which they were living. 
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5)   The tenure security requirement in the original SNP was laid down by the lender, not by 
any of the local sponsors of the project. The local government has continued providing 
services in slums without this requirement and has not experienced difficulties as a 
result. 
 
6)   The central government has recently introduced programs to support ‘slum free cities’ 
which include substantial components for new housing production, and PPPs which 
involve handing over high value land to developers with incentives such as additional FSI 
against provision of housing to those living in the slums located on that land, otherwise 
known as in situ slum redevelopment---in addition to funds for in situ slum improvement. 
The housing programs are in support of a promise to provide free homes of 270 sq ft. for 
all slum dwellers in the country. Such promises of free housing are unaffordable and 
cannot be implemented due to difficulties in obtaining large tracts of well-located land for 
building such housing. PPPs—at best—can only help only a small fraction of households 
in slums. The very additions to the formal housing stock which drive the private developer 
demand for such PPPs are infinitesimal in relation to the total number of households in 
slums.36 Yet, these promises of free housing for slum dwellers create expectations which 
make it harder to implement a large scale slum upgradation program. To avoid creating 
perverse incentives to hold out for larger subsidies, government should send a clear signal 
that opting for neighborhood upgradation will not compromise  eligibility for slum 
rehabilitation or allocation of subsidized EWS housing. The risks of duplication are small 
and can be managed.  
 
 
7) In Ahmedabad, government has considerably increased its production of new public 
housing through subsidies from central government. Even this level of production will 
likely be just enough to meet demands for relocation of certain slums due to 
infrastructure development.  
 
8) Providing universal access to services will be impeded by compulsions to plan for 
provision of free housing units as part of slum free city plans. :Local governments will 
feel compelled to plan which households should receive new housing, which slum areas 
will be slated for in situ redevelopment, which will get new housing which may or may 
not actually come available, and which will benefit from in situ upgradation. Such a 
planning exercise will delay implementation considerably as pressures to slate different 
areas for different types of development will lead to protracted deliberations that have no 
obvious or simple means of resolution. Instead government should undertake in situ 
upgradation throughout the city as quickly as possible, while relocating households as 
and when necessary for infrastructure development.  
 
9) Local governments will need to plan carefully for ensuring they can build and fund 
enough relocation units to meet the needs of any households that will be displaced due to 
infrastructure improvements. Then the process can take place in an orderly and dignified 
                                                 
36 In Ahmedabad, new housing production per annum was 2.4 percent of the total housing stock, as opposed to 
nearly one third of the housing stock being in challis/slums. Roughly one tenth  of that production was formal. That 
means that new formal housing amounts to about  0.24 percent of the total housing stock and less than one percent 
of the households in challis and slums today!  
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fashion for those unfortunate households—who deserve a well located home in 
compensation for displacement. Done correctly, these relocations will be a very small 
fraction of the total households living in slums.  Government can then decide how to 
recover costs of building the relocation housing, ideally through the infrastructure project 
budgets themselves. This provides the proper incentives for evaluating and designing 
infrastructure upgrade.  
 
10) The decision to consider rehabilitating slums in high value areas should be left to 
developers. It should follow market trends and be subject to the approval  of the affected 
community. Slating an area in a government sanctioned plan as high value and suitable 
for redevelopment will effectively take away any bargaining power of the households in 
such slums and compel them to agree with the terms of the developers. If, instead, all 
neighborhoods are planned for in situ improvements, and priority is provided to 
neighborhoods that accept in situ upgradation as their preferred option, then there is very 
little risk of waste. 
 
11)   Organization of local CBOs, who work with approved NGOs or other groups for 
forming such CBOs  has greatly improved the quality of implementation in the SNP. 
Slum upgradation programs in many cities are plagued by shoddy construction and 
implementation supervised by local governments. Without safeguards, there is 
considerable scope for exploiting the many disadvantages of slum dwellers in dealing 
with city administrations. CBOs and NGO involvement in the SNP served many practical 
purposes for minimizing such problems: keeping neighborhood households informed of 
their rights, giving them a role in supervising the quality of the works as well as the 
design of the program, minimizing demolitions and finding equitable, fair approaches to 
demolition. This worked because the participating NGOs were vetted carefully--in this 
case by a prestigious business school. Also the CBOs had control over key parts of the 
process. The individual household contributions mobilized by the CBOs were only 
released to contractors once the households and CBO approved the quality of the works.  
 
For these reasons, it is critical to ensure the NGOs are paid enough to mobilize local 
CBOs. In the SNP, NGOs were expected to contribute 30% of their costs out of their 
own funds, and the allowable cost was substantially lower than the real costs of 
community mobilization. Such design weaknesses would undermine a program seeking 
to operate at a large scale. For Ahmedabad, we estimated that the organization costs for 
creating the CBOs and working with them throughout the upgradation process would be 
about INR 10,000 (US$ 200) per household. This reflects market rates because if one is 
planning to complete a city-wide upgradation program over about five years, this would 
mean about 80,000 households per year. Working on that scale cannot be done on a 
partially volunteer or charitable basis alone.  
 
The process of establishing CBOs should be kept simple. In the SNP, each member was 
required to qualify for a micro loan whether they needed it or not. The necessary 
paperwork slowed down CBO formation by months, and left out the many households 
who cannot provide this paperwork due to many obstacles placed in the way of 
obtaining such papers for groups such as migrants in cities. Most households did not 
want to pay interest on a loan and did not take them in spite of all the delays that were 
caused by qualifying for micro loans.   
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The household contribution should be substantial –in our consultations, the consensus 
was that, in Ahmedabad, households could pay INR 5000 (about US$100) if spread out 
over the construction period. This represented 10 percent of estimated civil works costs.  
This requirement is needed to avoid abuses. When the household contribution is higher, 
contractors have a more serious incentive to provide quality works. If the amount the 
households can hold back against successful completion of works is only a token 
amount, then it is not that difficult for unscrupulous or incompetent operators simply to 
do shoddy work and forego this part of the payment.  
 
 
 
12)  Managing public relations well is a critical aspect of effective implementation, not just a 
nice add on. Households in slums are typically well informed and skeptical given how 
often programs do not deliver as promised. In Ahmedabad, CBO organization went much 
more quickly after some neighborhoods had been improved and prospective participants 
in the program could observe first hand what could be achieved. Therefore, it is essential 
to resist the technocratic temptation to plan out the full program before breaking ground. 
Starting work quickly in priority neighborhoods demonstrates commitment to results and 
will create momentum for organizing other communities. The small scale of 
neighborhood by neighborhood upgradation offers natural risk management. Any 
mistakes made in early upgradation projects can be corrected in later projects. Gains from 
learning on the job can easily be applied in later neighborhood upgradations. Even 
exhaustively planned projects suffer from execution and quality problems. Little evidence 
can be marshaled to demonstrate the benefits of comprehensive planning to be weighed 
against the costs of delay that such planning imposes.  
 
13) A major in situ upgrading program will create large demands for human resources and 
administrative processing capacity within the city government for a limited time, as the 
many small neighborhood level projects are completed. Each one needs to be supervised 
and approved by city engineers, procurements of all kinds of materials may have to go 
through the central stores. Working through standard administrative procedures will 
create bottlenecks and slow down implementation. These bottlenecks were experienced 
in the SNP. Special arrangements are needed to create flexibility in implementation 
through special goods and works procurement measures, deputation premia, 
subcontracting for technical skills needed only through the life of the project, while 
ensuring protection of the public interest through strong governance. Many in 
Ahmedabad believe their Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) model is a robust tool for 
achieving this.  
 
14) Public relations with the broader community are equally important. Proactive 
professional promotion of the program should be part of the budget, to ensure that the 
program is well known and that the many benefits not only to participating households 
are well understood. The NGOs participating in the SNP documented the many benefits, 
but few outside the specialized circle of urban specialists know about the many positive 
social impacts of slum upgradation for the families involved and for integration of these 
communities to the city at large. Such promotion of the program will help to counter the 
negative impression created when something goes wrong. Those ‘bad news’ events will 
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always tend to be well covered by the media, and they can tarnish the concrete 
achievements of such programs. Local language media are often a substantial and 
overlooked resource in creating justifiable civic pride in the achievements of a well 
thought out program. Slum upgradation is not glamorous and does not lend itself to large 
ribbon cutting ceremonies. Yet it touches lives in a very significant way. Pursuing the 
personal angle of how a family’s fortunes can change with neighborhood improvements 
may be a very productive avenue for public relations efforts.  
 
III. Preparing a Basic Real Estate Market Assessment 
 
1) The first step in a real estate market assessment is to understand the demand side of the 
market. The National Sample Survey (NSS) in India has recently published data on 
household expenditures for 2009/2010. These can be used to create a distribution of 
household expenditures by expenditure class for most Indian cities. While such survey 
data has its drawbacks and imperfections, this is nonetheless an excellent resource for 
understanding purchasing power and how it varies in different cities. This data can then 
be used to assess affordability of housing types for lower income groups and the middle 
class using simple rules of thumb relating monthly expenditure to an affordable home 
purchase price. These figures for different expenditure classes can then be compared to 
the costs of different types of formal housing. In the case of Ahmedabad, for example, we 
found that between 40 percent and 50 percent of households in the city cannot afford the 
lowest cost reasonably located formal home.  
 
2) Google Earth® was used in this study for locating and measuring various types of 
informal housing. For a knowledgeable viewer, it is possible to identify illegal colonies 
and substandard housing types. The extent of neighborhoods of these and other types, 
once identified can be translated into GIS programs to understand the composition of the 
housing stock as well as overall land use patterns. Historical images in Google Earth® 
(starting in 2001)  can also be used to estimate the increments to housing stock amongst 
all categories. This avoids the bias introduced by examining official records of building 
approvals etc., which are hard to get and only cover formal housing, a fraction of 
increments to stock. To estimate populations living in different types of housing, slums 
for example, one can use detailed surveys of a sampling of slum neighborhoods. These 
are almost always available in some form. Then the data can be used to extrapolate and 
obtain a reasonable rough number of households in slums or other substandard informal 
housing. Ground truthing is essential to validate classifications and number of units per 
land area derived from satellite photos, but the combination of the two is very powerful.  
 
3) Given that we now have census data from 2001, the start point of Google Earth® 
photography and from 2011, it is possible to look both at housing stock and populations 
changes and therefore analyze changes in land use and density patterns. In Ahmedabad, 
this enabled us to observe a shift of high density housing into the suburban areas while 
the lowest density areas remain in the city center. This is indicative of arbitrary 
constraints in the highly desirable city center areas. It also shows a general constraint on 
land as new built up space even in far flung areas is developing at exceptionally high 
densities. International research shows that all over the world, when incomes grow as 
they have in Ahmedabad, built up densities typically decline as people opt for and can 
pay for more open space and individual homes. Just the opposite is happening in 
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Ahmedabad as builders and home buyers even on the high end are economizing on land. 
The Google Earth® analysis also allowed us to observe the highly fragmented and 
sprawling development. (Clarification: built up space densities are high, but overall land 
use density is sprawling since there is a good deal of empty space among built up areas—
again a symptom of problems in the functioning of the land market.) This type of land 
use pattern without a dense city center will make public transport expensive and 
ineffective.  
 
4) Estimating changes in the housing stock of different types through our Google Earth® 
analysis allows an assessment of the supply response capacity in the formal Ahmedabad 
real estate market. The housing stock in total grew at 2.4 percent or roughly 50,000 units 
per year.  Based on government housing production data, for example, we were able to 
estimate that government housing after accelerating rapidly under GOI funding 
(JNNURM) still only accounts for about one fifth of total housing production. Slums and 
urban villages account for nearly half of annual housing production. The remaining 30 
percent of housing production is a mix of formal housing and illegal colonies of higher 
quality. This illustrates that total private or public production of formal housing is quite 
small. Even if all new formal housing went to poor households—clearly an 
overestimate—it would still take a generation or more to rehouse the 422,000 households 
in slums.  
 
5) Working through the numbers shows that neither public housing nor reservations on 
private formal housing can improve the living conditions of more than a small fraction of 
slum households. Improving the lives of people in slums must include measures to reduce 
the legal burden of living in a slum, improving the physical environments in slums, and 
reducing the very high hurdles of shifting from slums to formal legal housing. Any 
strategy for slum free cities must embrace multiple solutions that offer incremental gains 
to many households. Moreover, the problem cannot be solved only with government 
building programs. Structural constraints lead to situations like Ahmedabad’s where 
almost a third of the city’s households are in substandard illegal informal housing. 
Understanding and addressing these constraints is essential to long term improvements, 
and the city-wide real estate market assessment is a starting point in identifying the issues 
and possible solutions. 
  
6) The land use analysis pinpointed a number of symptoms of structural problems amenable 
to government action. Densification away from the city center, the most desirable part of 
the city indicates that development there is constrained by such policies as low FSI and 
high costs of redevelopment.(On redevelopment costs, see discussion below on property 
rights and land tenure). Together these prevent increases in the supply of housing and 
commercial space where it is most desired.  
 
Fragmented development at the periphery, failure to develop lands already zoned as 
urban areas, and a large backlog of approvals for conversion of tenure on specific plots 
for urban use and regularization of titles---all in the face of rapid real estate price 
increases--indicate important institutional obstacles to supply of land for newly built 
space even at the periphery. The high density of development that does take place at the 
periphery shows that private suppliers are economizing on a scarce and expensive 
resource.  
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7)  Discussions with developers working at all levels in the market as well as private 
individuals seeking to invest in their properties provided more detail on the issues.  
i. Developers at the periphery encounter a very complex, time consuming and 
unpredictable procedure for regularizing title to most newly built space. This 
procedure must pass both through the Revenue Department and other offices at the 
State level and through the city level authorities regarding building permissions and 
standards. Because this process requires good contacts and specialized knowledge, it 
is difficult for small developers or individual farmers to obtain the necessary 
permissions. The complexity of the processes thus reinforces the existing market 
power of a few large developers while also constraining overall supply and 
increasing the actual costs of producing built space. These uncertainties and 
complexities likewise bedevil redevelopment within the city.  
ii. The risks and complexity of these processes are underpinned by the profound 
ambiguities in land tenure and ownership. Unless a plot of land has been purchased 
from a government agency, which guarantees unambiguous property rights, making 
any major investment on the land entails considerable risks. It is virtually impossible 
to ascertain how to clarify title without engaging in a costly, time consuming process 
for each individual plot. At the end of that process, it is quite likely that a 
prohibitively costly solution of demolishing all existing structures and paying large 
fines is the only way forward to investing in improvements. This costly step would 
be a pre-requisite to seeking clean tenure from the state—but offers no guarantee that 
tenure could be given.  Such requirements prevent all but those for whom cost is no 
object from engaging in the process.  
   
 
Our investigations in Ahmedabad suggest that these problems affect all income 
groups, but they tend to affect lower income groups disproportionally. This is due to 
an overhang of past regulatory measures that may even have been repealed. If in the 
past, government placed a reservation on the plot, for example, due to the land 
ceilings limitation, or for use for the green belt or public housing, the owner might 
start litigation to contest this reservation, thus freezing land during legal proceedings 
(which can last 20 or 30 years). Meanwhile since his land use became irregular, the 
only means of getting value for the land is in grey market transactions, such as 
powers of attorney or irregular sales using government stamp paper but conferring 
no transfer of property rights. Land transacted this way is much less costly and well 
informed and well heeled buyers may be able to avoid taking these risks. For the 
poor, this steeply discounted land offers them some access to land, while they may 
not understand how deeply compromised these rights are or simply cannot afford 
land with better title. 
 
iii. Our land use analysis provides some confirmation to this hypothesis. After 2001, the 
development plan abolished new reservations and the Land Ceilings Act was 
repealed. No new lands were taken as a result. Likewise, we observe that the lands 
occupied by challis/slums have broadly stabilized since 2001. Growth in the 
numbers of units in challis/slums has been achieved through densification. 
Discussions with NGOs and finance institutions working in Ahmedabad have also 
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indicated that many low-income households in low-cost informal areas face such 
difficulties with land tenure. 
 
iv. Tenure problems could be resolved for many more lands if fast track, non-
adversarial systems to unlock compromised land assets are created along the lines of 
bankruptcy procedures. Such an approach offer a rules based means of resolving the 
competing claims that make land tenure issues so intractable while freeing up land 
for investment and formal housing finance.  This approach must also show flexibility 
for grandfathering existing buildings even if not up to city standards, provided basic 
health and safety requirements are met. This alternative to the punitive costs of 
building regularization and court cases could be undertaken on an incremental and 
voluntary basis, as were town planning schemes, with safeguards to protect poor and 
less informed household interests.  
 
v. Discussions with low-cost developers, NGOs, and our survey of housing patterns in 
Ahmedabad also indicate that high standards for formal housing enshrined in the 
city’s development regulations make requirements that impose very high costs on 
any household wishing to own a legal home—standards that are affordable to a 
fraction of the population, and only then if the family can move to a relatively distant 
suburban area. These standards are not met in the vast majority of the housing stock 
in Ahmedabad. This is true not only of challis and slums but of colonies all over the 
city. Thanks to the provision of backbone road infrastructure, many of these colonies 
are well laid out, well serviced by infrastructure including roads, and offer decent 
living conditions meet local cultural norms, and are affordable for lower and middle-
class households. Our inventory shows that these are a very common housing type in 
the city—clearly a popular choice the small-scale developers have refined over time.   
But new housing built to these norms is illegal and therefore remains in regulatory 
limbo until government decides to provide services and regularize the structures. 
Allowing flexibility to build to these ‘vernacular’ standards and regularize many of 
these neighborhoods offers scope for increasing the supply of genuinely low-cost 
affordable housing.  
 
 
8) In consultations, considerable concern was expressed regarding the impact of reforms 
on the concentration of the developer industry and the scope for capture of benefits of 
piecemeal poorly designed reforms. The current system, because of its complexity 
and risks, favors a small group who know how to navigate the system. Reforms that 
‘liberalize’ should ensure that the system that results is more easily accessible to 
developers and households wishing to build on their own. Without more competitive 
entry to the developer industry, there is a risk of capture of reforms. However, 
reforms that make competitive entry are quite possible through simplification of the 
highly complex systems that now characterize land management all over India. In 
Ahmedabad, the development authority made entry into land auctions more open and 
competitive by lowering thresholds for entry. Similar gains can be achieved in land 
use policy, and a concerted process of seeking out such approaches should be 
engaged.  
 
 
